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Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for contested EU policies in the 
public? To explain when EU policy-makers’ shift blame to the EU or the national 
level, existing research either focusses on policy-makers’ preferences or the policy-
specific governance design. This thesis develops a synoptic two-step model that 
explains the direction of policy-makers’ blame attributions by combining their prefer-
ences, constituting the demand for blame shifting, as well as supply conditions, 
represented by the governance design. First, policy-makers communicate 
strategically in the public and seek to avoid blame for themselves: EU institutions’ 
desire is to target the national level while member states shift blame most preferably 
to the EU-level, but also to each other as a ‘second best’ option. Second, while the 
EU’s complex decision-making structure opens scope for preference-led blame 
attributions, the latter is not necessarily unconstrained: if EU policies require active 
implementation, the public exposure of the implementer has an enabling or 
constraining influence on EU institutions’ and member states’ blame shifting. To 
check the plausibility of the two-step model, policy-makers’ blame attributions are 
examined by media content analysis in three cases of contested EU migration 
policies: (i) the EU’s border control regime, (ii) the common asylum policy, and (iii) the 
entitlement of intra-EU migrants to social welfare. The analysis of 911 articles and 
401 blame attributions corroborates the theoretical expectations: the direction of 
policy-makers’ blame shifting is shaped by both EU institutions’ and member states’ 
diverging preferences as well as the policy-implementation structure. Thereby, this 
thesis contributes to the theoretical clarification of the relationship between policy-
makers’ preferences and institutional opportunities within the EU’s multi-level 
system and provides the first empirical analysis thereof.

Keywords: blame shifting; European Union; governance design; media analysis; 
migration policies. 
Table of Contents 
1 Introducing the European Blame World 1 
2 Explaining Blame Shifting in the EU 5 
2.1 Conceptualising blame shifting 5 
2.2 Reviewing the state of the art: independent variables  
and theoretical gaps 7 
2.2.1	 Policy-makers’ preferences: the motivation for  
blame-avoidance and social-structural positions	 7

2.2.2	 The governance design: the endogenous complexity  
of EU policy-making and the visibility of implementers	 9

2.3 A two-step model of blame shifting: bringing preferences  
and the governance design together 11 
3 Research Design: Analysing Blame Shifting 15 
3.1 Selecting three cases of contested EU migration policies 15 
3.2 Measuring blame shifting by media content analysis 18 
4 Playing the Blame Game on the EU-level:  
Blame Shifting for the Contested External Border Policy 22 
4.1 The EU’s external border policy 22 
4.1.1	 Complex governance design and EU-level implementation	 23

4.1.2	 Public contestation: death at EU’s external borders	 24

4.1.3	 Theoretical expectations: blame shifting to the EU-level	 25

4.2 Blaming the EU-level for death in the Mediterranean 26 
4.2.1	 Member states blaming the EU-level	 26

4.2.2	 EU institutions stuck in the middle	 27

4.2.3	 Summarising the results: the EU-level blame game	 28

5 Playing the Blame Game on the National Level:  
Blame Shifting for the Contested Asylum System 30 
5.1  The Common European Asylum System 30 
5.1.1	 Complex governance design and implementation  
by member states	 30

5.1.2	 Public contestation: systematic deficiencies of the CEAS	 32

5.1.3	 Theoretical expectations: blame shifting to the national level	 34

5.2 Blaming the national level for a dysfunctional asylum system 35 
5.2.1	 Member states blaming each other	 35

5.2.2	 EU institutions blaming the national level	 37

5.2.3	 Summarising the results: the national level blame game	 37

6 Playing the Blame Game Across Levels: Blame Shifting  
for the Contested Entitlement of Intra-EU Migrants to Social Welfare 39 
6.1 Free movement and Union citizens’ entitlement to social welfare 39 
6.1.1	 Complex decision making and non-active implementation	 40

6.1.2	 Public contestation: alleging systematic ‘welfare migration’	 41

6.1.3	 Theoretical expectations: blaming the other governance level	 42

6.2  EU institutions and member states blaming each other  
for ‘welfare migration’ 43 
6.2.1	 Member states blaming the EU-level	 43

6.2.2	 EU institutions blaming the national level	 44

6.2.3	 Summarising the results: the cross-level blame game	 44

7 Three Blame Games 46 
7.1 The variance of policy-makers’ blame shifting across cases 46 
7.2 Assessing alternative explanations 48 
8 Conclusion 51 
8.1  The explanatory power of the two-step model 51 
8.2 Contributions and future research 52 
8.3 ‘Accountability avoidance’ in the EU 55 
References 57 
Secondary literature 57 
Newspaper articles 61 
Annex 67 
Table A.1: Selection of material 67 
Table A.2: Documentation of results across newspapers 68 
Table A.3: Documentation of results across countries 69 
Table A.4: Coding rules 70 
Table A.5: Decision rules in borderline cases 72 
List of Tables and Figures 
Figure 2.1: The two-stage model 13 
Table 3.1: Types of blame shifting 20 
Table 3.2: Theoretical expectations for the three cases 21 
Figure 4.1: Blame shifting for the border control policy 29 
Figure 5.1: Blame Shifting for the asylum policy 38 
Figure 6.1: Blame shifting for alleged ‘welfare migration’ 45 
Figure 7.1: Blame shifting by EU institutions 47 
Figure 7.2: Blame shifting by member states 47 
Table A.1: Selection of material 67 
Table A.2: Documentation of results across newspapers 68 
Table A.3: Documentation of results across countries 69 
Table A.4: Coding rules 70 
Table A.5: Decision rules in borderline cases 72 
1 Introducing the European Blame World 
“There has been a lot of finger pointing. Not enough finger painting,  
but too much finger pointing in the past weeks.” 
1
When policies are publicly contested, policy-makers have a strong incentive to 
deflect blame by shifting it to each other (Weaver 1986; Hood/Rothstein 2001; 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan/Hood 2005; Hood 2011).  This seems to apply particularly to the 2
European Union (EU), where EU institutions and member states shift blame for 
perceived policy failures back and forth to one another (Gerhards et al. 2009, 2013; 
Greuter 2014; Roose et al. 2016). However, the main direction of EU policy-makers’ 
public blame attributions varies across European blame games. For example, during 
the ‘financial crisis’, Greek politicians tended to blame the EU rather than other 
Eurozone member states for Greece’s disastrous economic situation (Scholl et al. 
2014). On the contrary, member states attributed the bulk of blame for the failed 
distribution of asylum seekers to each other during the ‘refugee crisis’ (see chapter 
4). This leads to the question: whom do EU institutions and member states blame for 
contested EU policies in the public? More precisely, under which conditions do 
policy-makers’ shift blame predominantly to actors at the national level or to actors 
at the EU-level? 
While blame shifting has been a subject of scientific debate with regard to the EU’s 
institutional design and its consequences for policy-makers’ accountability for some 
time , a growing literature examines the conditions under which blame is directed to 3
the national or the EU-level. In particular, two strands of research focus on different 
independent variables explaining the direction of blame attributions. One strand 
points to policy-makers’ diverging preferences that are derived from the general 
motivation to avoid blame as well as an actor’s position within the EU’s multi-level 
  	 Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker (cited by Weaver 2015a) joking about blame 1
shifting during the ‘refugee crisis’ – and indirectly blaming member states for the non-
registration of asylum seekers.
  	 Blame shifting is defined as “actors attribute failure to other actors” (Greuter 2014: 75). While 2
the literature points to a variety of blame-avoidance strategies like designing governance 
arrangements and individual policies (Hood 2011: 16-22; for the EU see Daugbjerg/Swinbank 
2007), in this thesis, the focus is on how EU policy-makers, i.e. member states and EU 
institutions, seek to deflect blame after a policy is perceived as a failure in the public by 
impression management: limiting blame by blaming others and thereby distancing themselves 
from the problem (Gerhards et al. 2009, 2013; Hood 2011: 50-53; Greuter 2014: 75).
  	 See e.g. Schmidt 2006: 30, 37, 129, 271f.; Daugbjerg/Swinbank 2007; Papadopoulos 2010: 3
1039; Rijpma 2010; Hood 2011: 42, 83, 122; Vasilopoulou et al. 2014; van Kessel/Castelein 
2016; Baider/Constantinou 2017.
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governance system (Gerhards et al. 2009, 2013; see also, Kumlin 2011; Greuter 
2014; Roose et al. 2016; Schlipphak/Treib 2017; Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 100-119). The 
other strand focuses on the influence of the governance design: under the condition 
of institutional complexity, it assumes that the policy-implementation structure, due 
to the visibility of implementing actors, determines the direction of blame attributions 
in the general public and theorises about the consequences for policy-makers’ 
blame shifting (Rittberger et al. 2016; Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2018).

So far, these two strands barely refer to each other. The blame-avoidance literature 
assumes that policy-makers can generally take advantage of the EU’s multi-level 
governance system to deflect blame. However, it fails to account for the influence of 
policy-specific institutional properties, as suggested by advocates of the gover-
nance design literature. Reversely, the latter research strand expects the policy-
implementation structure to determine the direction of policy-makers’ blame 
attributions. However, it theoretically neglects the diverging preferences of policy-
makers, emphasised by proponents of the blame-avoidance literature. Thus, the 
state of the art lacks a sound theoretical account of the relationship between policy-
makers’ preferences and varying institutional opportunities for blame shifting as well 
as a systematic empirical examination thereof.

Against this backdrop, this thesis develops a two-step model that integrates insights 
of both strands and explains the direction of policy-makers’ blame attributions for 
contested policies by the interaction of the demand for blame shifting (‘Whom do I 
want to blame?’) and supply conditions (‘Whom can I blame?’). In line with the 
blame-avoidance literature, the demand for blame shifting is assumed to be shaped 
by policy-makers’ preferences. Based on their position in the EU’s multi-level system 
as well as their motivation to minimise blame, two types of EU policy-makers favour 
different blame targets: EU institutions desire to shift blame to the national level; 
member states prefer to blame the EU-level, while, as a ‘second best’ alternative, 
they also blame other member states. Whether their demand can be met depends 
on supply conditions constituted by the institutional opportunities for blame shifting, 
as proposed by the governance design literature: while the EU’s complex 
governance design opens scope for strategic communication, the latter is not 
necessarily unconstrained. If EU policies require active implementation, the public 
visibility of the implementer constrains or enables interest-led blame attributions 
since policy-makers also want to obtain an ‘illusion of objectivity’ vis-à-vis their 
 2
audience. Taken together, the combination of policy-makers’ diverging preferences 
(demand) as well as the varying policy-implementation structure (supply) shapes the 
direction of their blame attributions. Based on this assumption, conjectures for the 
six constellations (1-6) of the two independent variables can be deduced:

• If policy-implementation is executed by an EU-level actor, (1) for EU institutions, 
supply and demand are in tension and thus blame to the EU-level will be 
moderate, while (2) the supply side enables member states to realise their first 
preference and attribute the bulk of the blame to the EU-level.

• If policy-implementation is executed by member state authorities, (3) EU 
institutions and (4) member states fulfil their demand in accordance with the 
supply side and shift the blame predominantly to the national level – the share of 
blame to the EU-level is thus low.

• If active policy-implementation is not required, supply side constraints are absent 
and policy-makers freely realise their demand: (5) EU institutions blame the 
national level while (6) member states blame the EU-level.

The plausibility of the two-step model is checked by conducting a media content 
analysis, examining policy-makers’ blame shifting in three cases of contested 
migration policies with varying implementation structure: (i) the EU’s external border 
policy; (ii) the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and its cornerstone, the 
‘Dublin system’; (iii) and freedom of movement-related policies on the entitlement of 
intra-EU migrants to claim access to social assistance at their place of residence. 
The analysis finds the two-step model able to account for variation both across 
cases as well as between the two types of EU policy-makers:

• regarding the external border control regime, implemented by the EU agency 
Frontex, (1) EU institutions blamed the national and EU-level to a similar degree 
while (2) member states shifted the bulk of blame to the EU-level while;

• in the asylum system case where member state authorities were the implementers, 
(3) EU institutions and (4) member states alike shifted the bulk of blame to actors 
at the national level;

• concerning the rules entitling intra-EU migrants to social assistance which do not 
require active implementation, (5) EU institutions exclusively blamed the national 
level, while (6) member states shifted the large part of blame to the EU-level.

This thesis thereby makes a twofold contribution. Theoretically, the relationship 
between policy-makers’ preferences and the governance design, which so far 
 3
remained ambiguous in the literature, is clarified and their combined influence on the 
direction of blame shifting is theorised. Finding the two-step model to account for 
the observed empirical variation allows to qualify assumptions of both research 
strands. Contrary to the blame-avoidance literature, the opportunity structure for 
strategic blame attributions in the complex EU multi-level system is not constant but 
varies across policies according to their implementation structure. Against the 
expectations of the governance design literature, policy-makers’ preferences have a 
considerable influence on their blame attributions.

Empirically, this thesis offers the first systematic analysis of blame shifting by two 
types of policy-makers and across policies with varying governance designs. 
Thereby, empirical variation across and within European blame games that has so far 
been overlooked by existing research is uncovered. Proponents of the blame-
avoidance literature only analysed blame shifting above the level of individual 
policies and thus are unable to account for the impact of policy-specific institutional 
properties. Advocates of the governance design literature only examined the 
direction of blame in the general public, neglecting policy-makers and their diverging 
preferences. Thus, they could not test their assumptions about the influence of the 
implementation structures on policy-makers’ blame shifting patterns.

In the next chapter (2), I briefly conceptualise the dependent variable, i.e. the 
direction of EU policy-makers’ blame attributions. Then, I critically review the state 
of the art with regard to explanations for blame shifting as well as the relationship 
between policy-makers’ preferences and institutional opportunities. Building on 
these insights, the two-step model is developed in order to explain the direction of 
policy-makers’ blame attributions. The third chapter (3) introduces the research 
design and describes the method used for data collection. The next three chapters 
are dedicated to the case studies: the direction of EU institutions’ and member 
states’ blame attributions are examined within the cases of EU border control (4), the 
distribution of asylum seekers (5), and the so-called ‘welfare migration’ (6). Against 
the backdrop of the results across the three cases and between the types of policy-
makers, the superiority of the combined two-step model over the alternative 
explanations, based on only one of the independent variables, is demonstrated (7). 
The concluding chapter (8) summarises the theoretical argument as well as the 
contributions of this thesis and gives an outlook on political consequences and their 
effect on policy-makers’ accountability. 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2 Explaining Blame Shifting in the EU 
In order to explain when EU institutions and member states publicly shift blame to 
actors at the national or at the EU-level, this thesis develops a two-step model that 
brings together policy-makers’ diverging preferences (the demand side) as well as 
policy-specific institutional opportunities (the supply side). In the following, the 
dependent variable, i.e. the direction of policy-makers’ blame attributions, is 
conceptualised (2.1). By reviewing the state of the art on blame shifting in the EU, I 
identify two independent variables of central importance: policy-makers’ preferences 
and institutional properties of the policy-specific governance design. Particular 
focus is on these approaches’ assumptions about the relationship between 
institutional opportunities and policy-makers’ preferences (2.2). Building on these 
insights, I then theorise on how policy makers’ preferences, and the policy-
implementation structure shape their blame attributions. On the basis of the two-
step model, conjectures about the influence of combinations of the two independent 
variables on the direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting are derived (2.3).

2.1 Conceptualising blame shifting 
This thesis aims at explaining when EU policy-makers shift blame for contested 
policies predominantly to the national or the EU-level. Thus, the dependent variable 
is the direction of EU policy-makers’ blame shifting. In general, blame describes “the 
act of attributing something considered to be bad or wrong to some person or 
entity” (Hood 2011: 6). Blame thus consists of two components: (i) an element of 
perceived and avoidable harm or loss, i.e. “something is seen as being worse for 
some person or group than it could have been if matters had been handled 
differently” (ibid.); and (ii) the attribution of agency, i.e. “harm was avoidable because 
it was caused by acts of omission or commission by some identifiable individual or 
organisation” (ibid.; cf. Sulitzeanu-Kenan/Hood 2005: 2f.). 

A blame attribution consists of (i) an actor that attributes blame (‘sender of blame’); 
(ii) a subject for which blame is attributed (‘subject of blame’); and (iii) an actor to 
whom blame is attributed (‘direction of blame’). Depending on the direction of 
blame, blame shifting, i.e. “actors attribute failure to other actors” (Greuter 2014: 75) 
can be differentiated from blame acceptance, i.e. “actors acknowledge their past 
 5
failures” (ibid.). Since the latter is not subject of this analysis, the terms attributing 
and shifting blame are used interchangeable. 
4
This thesis focusses on EU policy-makers shifting blame for contested policies to 
actors at the national or the EU-level. The senders of blame, EU policy-makers, are 
defined as entities participating in the EU’s decision-making process. They are 
differentiated into two types: (i) EU institutions (the Commission, the Council, and 
the European Parliament) and (ii) member states (national governments).  The 5
targets of blame include the latter as well as any other actor participating in policy-
implementation. Blame targets are categorised according to their governance level 
in (i) actors at the EU-level and (ii) actors at the national level. These categories 
constitute the two values of the dependent variable. Finally, the subject – and 
context – of EU policy-makers’ blame attributions are contested policies, i.e. EU 
policies that are publicly perceived and criticised as failures. 
6
Consider as an example Commissioner Viviane Reding stating “that only Britain was 
to blame for any abuses of the benefit system by European nationals” (cited by 
Waterfield 2013b: 12). Here, the sender of blame (‘Viviane Reding’) represents an EU 
institution while the direction of blame (‘Britain’) represents an actor at the national 
level. The contested policy constituting the subject of blame comprises the EU rules 
on the entitlement of intra-EU migrants to social services that were publicly criticised 
for promoting welfare migration (e.g. Lynch 2013: 11; see 6.1).

Summarising, the dependent variable consists of an EU policy-maker attributing 
blame for a contested policy to actors at the national or the EU-level and thus can 
have one of two values.

  	 This definition of ‘blame attributions’ corresponds to the concept ‘assignment of negative 4
causal responsibility’ that underlies most of the empirical research on this topic (e.g. Gerhards 
et al. 2009, 2013; Greuter 2014; Rittberger et al. 2016). Both have to be differentiated from 
‘competence attributions’ whereby an actor demands that a certain entity should be 
responsible to address a particular policy problem or issue (Gerhards et al. 2009: 116).
  	 The Council is treated as an EU-level rather than national actor since the EU institution is 5
assumed to be more than the sum of member state governments: as a sender of blame, it is 
represented by the President of the European Council and thus speaks with one voice; 
regarding the direction of blame, policy-makers attributing blame can always choose between 
blaming individual (or fractions of) member states and the Council in general, particularly when 
decision-making authority was pooled through qualified majority voting (cf. Gerhards et al. 
2009: 535, 537; 2013: 121, 125; Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2018).
  	 This definition builds on the insight that “‘success’ and ‘failure’ are not inherent attributes of 6
policy, but rather labels applied by stakeholders and observers” (Bovens/’t Hart 2016: 654; see 
also, Howlett 2012; Oppermann/Spencer 2016). For reasons to opt for contested policies as a 
‘research window’ for analysing policy-makers’ blame shifting, see 3.1.2.
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2.2 Reviewing the state of the art:   
independent variables and theoretical gaps 
A growing literature aims at explaining the attribution of blame in the EU’s multi-level 
governance system. Two strands of research focus on different independent 
variables that are of central importance for explaining the direction of blame: policy-
makers’ preferences as well as the governance design. In the following, these two 
approaches are presented and critically discussed. Thereby, particular attention is 
on how the state of the art conceptualises the relationship between policy-makers’ 
preferences – the demand side – and institutional opportunities – the supply side.

2.2.1 Policy-makers’ preferences: the motivation for blame-avoidance  
and social-structural positions 
One strand of research explains the direction of blame attributions by policy-makers’ 
preferences stemming from their general motivation to avoid blame as well as their 
social-structural position within the EU’s political system. Their basic assumption is 
that policy-makers’ central motivation is to avoid blame.  They thus are expected to 7
communicate strategically in the public and attribute responsibility for success to 
themselves, while blaming others for failures – the admission of mistakes is seen as 
the least desired option. In a nutshell: “It’s always the others’ fault.” (Gerhards et al. 
2013: 113; translation THW; cf. ibid. 2009: 533; Greuter 2014: 72-74; Roose et al. 
2016: 41).

Against this backdrop, Gerhards et al. (2009: 534, 2013: 113) derive the preferences 
about the direction of blame shifting of two types of EU policy-makers from their 
different positions in the EU’s multi-level political system (see also, Hood 2011: 42). 
They assume the Commission to shift blame only to member states and not to other 
EU institutions: “as a supranational institution, it is primarily committed to the EU, 
and it is in its immediate interest to present the EU and its institutions in a positive 
light” (Gerhards et al. 2013: 125, cf. 2009: 537; translation THW). On the contrary, 
member state governments are expected to blame the Commission as well as other 
member states (Gerhards et al. 2009: 535f., 2013: 121-123). Furthermore, they find 
in their empirical analysis that national governments frequently shift blame to the 
Council or ‘the EU’ in general even though this constitutes a quasi self-attribution: 
  	 This builds on insights from the domestic context (Weaver 1986, 1988; Hood 2002a, 2002b, 7
2007, 2011; Hood/Rothstein 2001; Hood et al. 2009, 2016; Sulitzeanu-Kenan/Hood 2005).
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“The national governments obviously play a double game: […] unpopular decisions, 
which they themselves […] have co-decided, are attributed to the Council or ‘the 
EU’” (Gerhards et al. 2009: 553; translation THW).

Regarding the relationship between institutional opportunities and policy-makers’ 
preferences on the direction of blame attributions, the blame-avoidance literature 
assumes that the EU multi-level system generally provides actors with an opportunity 
structure for their blame-avoidance strategies: 

“[…] there is a particular margin in the EU’s multi-level system. As soon as 
several actors and political levels are involved in a decision, it becomes more 
difficult for the observer to determine who has to take responsibility for specific 
measures and decisions; accordingly, the opportunities for an interest-led 
interpretation of political responsibility for […] failures grow.” (Gerhards et al. 
2009: 533; translation THW; cf. ibid. 535, 2013: 113-115, 127-132; see also, 
Roose et al. 2016: 41; Hood 2011: 83, 122)

The underlying rational is that “since responsibility for most policy outcomes is 
shared between national and EU Institutions […] policy outcomes may legitimately 
be attributed to either level” (Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 15). This then provides “ample 
possibilities for every major player in the structure to blame every other” (Hood 2011: 
122; emphasis THW). In a nutshell, “attribution opportunities in the European 
multilevel system are manifold” (Gerhards et al. 2013: 121; translation THW).

Beyond this very general theoretical assumption, the blame-avoidance literature fails 
to theoretically account for the impact of varying properties of the policy-specific 
governance design on the direction of policy-makers’ blame attributions, which is 
suggested by advocates of the governance design literature. As a consequence, this 
strand of research empirically analysed blame shifting patterns only above the level 
of individual policies. Studies either examined the coverage of the EU in general 
(Gerhards et al. 2009, 2013) or broader topics like the ‘financial crisis’ (Greuter 2014; 
Roose et al. 2016; Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 100-119; Scholl et al. 2014). Thereby, the 
blame-avoidance literature risks flawed inferences. Finally, advocates of this strand 
assume that the EU in general and the Commission in particular is structurally 
disadvantaged in blame games due to the lack of a European public sphere and the 
dominance of national governments in their national publics. In consequence, the 
EU is expected to fulfil the “ideal scapegoat function” (Gerhards et al. 2005: 9; 
translation THW; cf. ibid. 2009: 533; see also, Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 100f.). However, 
this insight does not lead to explicit assumptions about member states’ preference 
order, i.e. if they prefer blaming EU institutions or other member state governments.

 8
Summarising, the blame-avoidance literature explains the direction of policy-makers’ 
blame shifting by their preferences stemming from the motivation in minimising 
blame as well as their position in the EU’s multi-level system. While this research 
strand offers a compelling explanation for different types of policy-makers’ diverging 
preferences for the direction of blame shifting – the demand side –, it neglects 
variation in the governance design constituting supply conditions.

2.2.2 The governance design: the endogenous complexity  
of EU policy-making and the visibility of implementers 
A second research strand examines the influence of the governance design on the 
direction of blame attributions. While its focus is on responsibility attributions in the 
general public and not on policy-makers’ blame shifting behaviour, it offers valuable 
insights for the margin of the latter. The governance design literature assumes that, 
under the condition of institutional complexity, the policy-implementation structure 
determines the direction of blame attributions in the public due to the visibility of 
implementing actors (Rittberger et al. 2016; Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2018).

The basic assumption is that the institutional complexity of policy-making in the EU 
affects the direction of public responsibility attributions by endogenously reducing 
the clarity of responsibility (cf. Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 24). In the EU, policy-making is 
usually complex, i.e. multiple actors across multiple levels of governance share 
policy-making authority in a multi-stage process.  For example, in the EU’s ordinary 8
legislative procedure, policy-making authority is divided between the Council and 
the European Parliament (EP), acting on the initiative of the Commission. Due to the 
general public’s lack of knowledge about how policy-making authority is distributed 
in the EU’s multi-level system, the latter is expected to be unlikely to inform their 
responsibility attributions (Rittberger et al. 2016: 4; cf. Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 45). 
9
Against this backdrop, the structure of policy-implementation is generally assumed 
to determine the direction of blame attributions in the public. If policies do not need 
active implementation, due to institutional complexity, public responsibility 
attributions for policy failures are expected to be “infrequent, untargeted and thus 
  	 Thanks go to Bernhard Zangl for this straightforward definition of institutional complexity; see 8
also, Rittberger et al. 2016: 5; Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2018.
  	 This insight is based on voting research finding that the clarity of responsibility in federal 9
systems conditions voters’ ability to make ‘correct’ judgements about who is responsible for 
policy outcomes (Anderson 2000; de Vries et al. 2011; Hellwig 2001; Hellwig/Samuels 2008; 
Powell 2000; Powell/Whitten 1993; Whitten/Palmer 1999; Cutler 2004, 2008; Hobolt et al. 2013; 
see also, Javeline 2003).
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diffuse” (Rittberger et al. 2016: 4). If an implementing actor is required, the latter is 
assumed to become focal and thus the prime target of blame (ibid. 3).  In other 10
words, when looking for an actor to blame for policy failures, the public is seen likely 
to employ a “policy-implementation heuristic” (Heinkelmann-Wild et al. 2018). Thus, 
an implementing actor, due to its public exposure and visibility, is expected to 
substitute for the lack of institutional clarity in the EU’s multi-level policy-making 
processes and attract the general public’s blame. While Rittberger et al. (2016) do 
not make this an explicit assumption, in the case of EU-level implementation, the 
public might use the ‘policy-implementation heuristic’ as a ‘short cut’ to blame not 
only to the specific implementing actor but the whole EU-level (see also, Hobolt et 
al. 2013: 170). Indeed, their empirical analysis finds public responsibility attributions 
under the condition of EU-level implementation to target the specific implementer 
and ‘the EU’ in general to a similar degree.

What follows from these assumptions on responsibility attributions in the general 
public for EU institutions’ and member states’ blame shifting? Regarding the 
relationship between institutional opportunities and policy-makers’ preferences on 
the direction of blame attributions, the governance design literature assumes the 
primacy of the policy-implementation structure: policy-makers are expected to shift 
blame to the actor (or governance level) responsible for policy-implementation 
(Rittberger et al. 2016: 5, 13f.). If active implementation is not required, policy-
makers are generally expected to exploit the “beneficial opportunity structure” (ibid. 
4). Hence, the institutional opportunities of the policy-specific governance design 
are assumed to determine the direction of policy-makers’ blame attributions.

However, while this literature provides valuable insights on the general influence of 
the governance design on public responsibility attributions, regarding policy-makers’ 
blame shifting, it remains merely theoretical. Rittberger et al. assume that “the 
personal involvement of the attributing actors [did not] contaminate our findings on 
the impact of authority structures” (2016: 7, note 3) and thus neglect policy-makers’ 
diverging preferences. In this regard, the direction of policy-makers’ blame 
attributions for policies that do not require active implementation remains a 
theoretical blindspot. As a consequence, this research strand empirically only 
examined the general direction of blame in the public, including statements by 
  	 The ‘implementer hypothesis’ builds on studies in experimental economics that have demons-10
trated that in principal-agent relationships, blame is primarily attributed to implementing agents 
(Bartling/Fischbacher 2008; Coffman 2011; Hill 2015; Oexl/Grossman 2012).
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politicians, while neglecting the variety on site of blame senders. Thus, it is unable to 
detect variation regarding the direction of EU institutions’ and member states’ blame 
shifting, emphasised by proponents of the blame-avoidance literature, even when 
the institutional context remains the same. Hence, the impact of the policy-specific 
governance design on policy-makers’ blame shifting so far remained an assumption.

Summarising, the second research strand expects the governance design to 
predominantly shape blame shifting. If policy-making is complex, the structure of 
policy-implementation is expected to determine the direction of blame. While this 
literature offers a first viable account of institutional opportunities and constraints for 
policy-makers’ blame shifting in the EU – and thus the supply conditions –, these 
assumptions remain theoretical and vague for some parts. 

The two discussed strands of research each focus on a different variable shaping 
the direction of blame attributions: policy-makers’ preferences as well as the policy-
specific governance design.  However, the literature so far lacks a clear account of 11
their relationship of these two factors. In the next section, this gap is addressed by 
developing a synoptic two-step model of how policy-makers’ preferences (the 
demand side) and the governance design (the supply side) interact shaping the 
direction of EU institutions’ and member states’ blame attributions.

2.3 A two-step model of blame shifting:  
bringing preferences and the governance design together 
What effect do policy-makers’ preferences and the governance design have on 
blame shifting in the EU? To address this question, I develop a theoretical approach 
that brings together insights from both existing research strands. In the following, 
the two-step model that integrates policy-makers’ preferences (the demand side) as 
well as the governance design (the supply side), is presented. By clarifying their 
relationship and influence on the direction of blame attributions, the gap in the state 
of the art is closed.

The theoretical framework starts from the basic assumption that both opportunities 
and preferences are important for social science explanations (cf. Elster 2015: 190f.). 
Against this backdrop, conflating the insights of the existing literature, I propose a 
two-step model to explain the direction of policy-makers’ blame attributions. 
  	 Note that for both approaches, a complex governance design is a scope condition.11
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Thereby, I distinguish between the demand for blame shifting, i.e. policy-makers’ 
preferences based on their motivation (‘Whom do I want to blame?’), as well as the 
supply for blame shifting, i.e. the institutional opportunities within the governance 
design (‘Whom can I blame?’). 
12
The demand for blame shifting is shaped by policy-makers’ preferences. Policy-
makers are assumed to follow two goals when attributing blame (cf. Kunda 1990; 
see also, Schwarzenbeck 2015: 43). Firstly, they are driven by motivations to achieve 
a desired outcome, i.e. “any wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome 
of a given reasoning task” (Kunda 1990: 480). Building on the blame-avoidance 
literature, policy-makers’ main motivation is assumed to be minimising blame for 
themselves. Policy-makers communicate strategically in public and thus refrain from 
attributing blame to themselves.  Based on their position in the EU’s multi-level 13
system, the two types of EU policy-makers have diverging preferences about the 
direction of blame shifting: (i) EU institutions are assumed to prefer attributing blame 
to the national level. (ii) Member states can blame each other or the EU-level. 
However, the latter is assumed to be more attractive since, due to the lack of a 
European public sphere, “the European Union is structurally disadvantaged […] and 
thus fulfils an ideal scapegoat function” (Gerhards et al. 2005: 9; translation THW).  14
Thus, while member states prefer to shift the blame to the EU-level, blaming other 
member states constitutes a ‘second best’ option; for EU institutions, blaming the 
EU-level is the ‘second worst’ alternative since it means a quasi self-attribution.

Secondly, it is assumed that policy-makers can only shift blame according to their 
directional goals up to the point where they can still maintain the ‘illusion of 
objectivity’ (Kunda 1990: 482f.; see also, Schwarzenbeck 2015: 37). The importance 
of coherence with the institutional context for blame-avoidance strategies to be 
successful is also emphasised by Hood (2010: 146f., 160). The conditions that 
shape the margin of preference-led blame attributions within the EU multi-level 
system constitute the supply side. 
15
  	 The inspiration for the demand-supply-framework stems from Leuffen et al. 2013: 34-39.12
  	 It is generally assumed that if policies are publicly contested, every policy-maker has a basic 13
incentive to engage in blame-avoidance strategies since the “blame risk” (Hood 2011: 8) rises.
  	 Member states’ first preference for “playing the blame game on Brussels” (Schlipphak/Treib 14
2017: 355) is also in line with the general thrust of the literature (cf. Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 100f.).
  	 The relationship between supply and demand side factors is assumed to be probabilistic. 15
 12
Whether the demand for blame shifting can be realised depends on supply 
conditions for blame shifting, i.e. the opportunities shaped by the institutional 
context. In general, the margin of strategic blame shifting is shaped by the 
governance design, more precisely, its endogenous transparency: the larger the 
in-transparency, the more subjective blame attributions can be argumentatively 
stretched (Schwarzenbeck 2015: 43, cf. 2017: 49-51). Building on the governance 
design literature, while the often complex institutional structure of decision-making 
opens up a great margin for preference-led blame attributions, it is constrained by 
the structure of policy-implementation. Due to its public visibility, an active 
implementing actor is assumed to influence the general public discourse by 
attracting blame to itself or, in the case of EU-level implementation, the whole 
governance level.  Since policy-makers’ want to maintain an ‘illusion of objectivity’ 16
when shifting blame in the public, the focal position of implementing actors is thus 
assumed to constrain their blame attributions.  If no active implementation is 17
needed, policy-makers can freely exploit the complexity of the EU's multi-level 
governance system and shift blame solely according to their preferences. Taken 
together, demand and supply factors for blame shifting result in an outcome: an 
attribution pattern characterised by a specific degree of blame to actors at the 
national and/or the EU-level (see Figure 2.1).

  	 While this remains a mere implicit assumption in the governance design literature, as 16
discussed above, research in other fields support this expectation: under conditions of 
institutional complexity, the public also tends to blame collective organisations instead of 
individual actors (cf. Schwarzenbeck 2015: 47f., 219, 2017: 54; see also Pfeiffer 1995: 16).
  	 Note that the exact cognitive mechanism underlying the attribution decision is not of prime 17
interest for this thesis. For example, policy-makers do not necessarily need believe their own 
blame attributions but adapt them in order to increase public resonance (cf. Gerhards et al. 
2009: 531). Furthermore, it does not matter whether policy-makers public communication 
neglects the implementation structure and then the public discourse filters out ‘unreasonable’ 
statements; if politicians anticipate this and adapt their strategies; or if they learn over time.
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Preferences  
of blame senders 
• EU: blame MS

• MS: blame EU  
> other MS












Direction of blame 
• Actors at EU-level 

• Actors at the  
national level
Demand Supply Outcome
Figure 2.1: The two-stage model
Source: own compilation.
After clarifying the relationship between policy-makers’ preferences (the demand 
side) and the governance design (the supply side), in the next step, conjectures 
about the direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting are derived from the two-step 
model. Under the condition of institutional complexity, it is expected that the 
combination of the type of policy-maker, either an EU institution or member state 
with corresponding preferences, and a particular policy-implementation structure, 
results in a certain direction of blame. This allows to derive conjectures about the 
direction of blame shifting for the six possible constellations (1-6) of the independent 
variables (see also, Table 2.1).

• If policy-implementation is executed by an EU-level actor, (1) for EU institutions, 
supply and demand are in tension and thus blame to the EU-level will be 
moderate, while (2) the supply side enables member states to realise their first 
preference and attribute the bulk of the blame to the EU-level.

• If policy-implementation is executed by member state authorities, (3) EU 
institutions and (4) member states fulfil their demand in accordance with the 
supply side and shift the blame predominantly to the national level – the share of 
blame to the EU-level is thus low.

• If active policy-implementation is not required, supply side constraints are absent 
and policy-makers realise their demand: (5) EU institutions blame the national level 
while (6) member states blame the EU-level.

Summarising, the two-step model combines insights from the existing research 
strands to explain the combined impact of policy-makers’ preferences (the demand 
side) and the governance design (the supply side) on the direction of their blame 
attributions. By clarifying the interaction of the two independent variables, I am able 
to make more differentiated predictions about blame shifting in the EU. 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3 Research Design: Analysing Blame Shifting 
The plausibility of the two-step model will be evaluated by checking the theoretical 
conjectures about the direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting by congruence 
analyses of three cases. Based on a Most Similar System Design (MSSD), three 
contested EU migration policies with varying policy-implementation structures are 
selected and blame attributions by EU institutions and member states are examined. 
Data was collected by qualitative content analyses of the quality press coverage. In 
the following, the case selection is presented (3.1). Subsequently, the methodo-
logical approach as well as the data collection procedure including sample selection 
and coding rules are described (3.2).

3.1 Selecting three cases of contested EU migration policies 
In the last chapter, the two-step model was developed and conjectures for different 
combinations of the independent variables, i.e. policy-makers’ preferences and the 
policy-specific governance design, were derived. The plausibility of the conjectures 
shall be evaluated by comparing these theory-led expectations about the direction 
of blame shifting with the distribution of policy-makers’ blame in three cases.

Case selection is based on a Most Similar System Design (MSSD) (Leuffen 2007: 
207; Hönnige 2007: 226; see also, Przeworski/Teune 1982: 32f.). This allows to 
control for potentially confounding factors (cf. Sieberer 2007: 258-262) while the 
independent variables vary across the cases. If the dependent variable, i.e. direction 
of the policy-makers’ blame shifting, varies along with the independent variables, 
inferences can be made on their causal effect. The effect of the variables is traced in 
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Table 2.1: Conjectures about the direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting 






EU (1) moderate (3) low (5) low
MS (2) high (4) low (6) high 
Source: own compilation.
qualitative case studies. Thereby, the congruence between the relative distribution of 
aggregated blame attributions by EU institutions and member states in the media 
discourse and theoretical explanations is checked.  As a supplement, the 18
plausibility of the theoretical model is further corroborated on the basis of individual 
policy-makers constituting ‘least likely’ observations, i.e. their specific preferences 
would suggest not to shift blame according to the theoretical assumptions. If their 
attributions nevertheless show the predicted blame patterns, this strengthens the 
model (cf. Schwarzenbeck 2017: 71f.; see also, King et al. 1994: 209; Leuffen 2007: 
210f.). In a last step, findings are compared and the explanatory power of alternative 
explanations for which case selection could not control are checked across cases. 

Against this backdrop, case selection must meet two criteria: the policies for which 
blame is assigned must be similar in all cases to ensure the comparability of blame 
shifting patterns; and blame shifting by EU institutions and member states must be 
measurable and relatively frequent. Where can we observe manifestations of blame 
shifting by policy-makers best? According to Hood (2011: 8), this depends on the 
“blame risk”: “We will be more motivated to engage in efforts to avoid blame the 
more likely we think blame will occur and the more serious we think the 
consequences will be for us if we do come to be blamed.” Publicly contested 
policies are particularly suitable to studying blame shifting since the public demand 
of accountability and thus the legitimacy pressure on them tends to be higher in the 
case of EU policy outputs or outcomes that trigger publicly salient dissent and 
dissatisfaction (cf. Zangl/Rittberger 2017: 5). Thus, strategic communication by EU 
institutions and member states in cases of publicly contested policies can be 
expected to be frequent.

In order to evaluate the plausibility of the two-step model, three contested EU 
migration policies were selected: (i) the case of EU border control, (ii) the case of EU 
asylum policy, and (iii) the policy on the entitlement of intra-EU migrants to social 
services. The need for implementation as well as the type of the implementing agent 
varies across the three cases: Frontex is implementing the EU’s border control 
policy, while EU member states are the main implementing actors in the asylum 
case. In the ‘welfare migration’ case, policies do not require an implementing agent 
but obliges EU institutions and member states to refrain from direct political 
  	 According to Schwarzenbeck (2017: 71), the congruence method is well suited for this purpose 18
since the causal process between the variables and policy-makers’ blame attributions does not 
have to be traced down to the smallest detail, but cognitive processes are left in a ‘black box’.
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intervention such as from discriminating between their nationals and Union citizens. 
Variance with regard to the preferences of blame senders is ensured by examining 
two types of policy-makers, EU institutions as well as member states, in all cases.

In other dimensions, the three policies are similar allowing to control for potentially 
confounding factors. First, all three policies were publicly contested as they were 
broadly perceived as policy failures in the public.  Since the subjects of public 19
criticism were not prescribed in advance but coded during the analysis (see Annex, 
Table A.4), this should have prevented selection bias.

Second, the institutional structures underlying the three policies were all instances of 
complex governance design, that is assumed to be a scope condition for the 
theoretical model. For the purpose of this thesis, a policy-specific governance 
design is assumed to be sufficiently complex if the underlying decision-making 
process meets the following characteristics: following a proposal of the 
Commission, the Council decides on legislation (unanimously or by qualified majority 
voting); the European Parliament is either co-legislator or at least consulted.  In all 20
three cases, decision-making either followed the ‘community method’ where the 
Commission proposes a policy, which the EP jointly enacts with the Council or 
legislation was initiated by the Commission and then decided by the Council after 
consulting the EP under special provisions due to a transitional period of five years 
following the Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 67(1) of the Treaty of the EC). Most 
importantly, for a large part of the examined period and legislation, decision-making 
across all cases was constant and based on the ordinary legislative procedure, i.e. 
  	 The identified policy failures are presented in the case studies (see 4.1.2, 5.1.2, 6.1.2). It is 19
generally assumed that properties of policy failures (e.g. their perceived severity) did not 
contaminate findings on the direction of blame shifting (cf. Rittberger et al. 2016: 7, note 3).
  	 Complex governance design encompasses decision-making processes that equal the 20
categories ‘joint decision-making I or II’ as conceptualised by Börzel (2005: 221) and 
commonly referred to as ‘community method’ (Leuffen et al. 2013: 14): following a proposal of 
the Commission, which possesses the exclusive right of initiative, the Council and EP bargain 
over the final legislative outcome; the EP can exercise legislative influence by proposing 
amendments, which the Council has to take into account; the latter then decides by unanimity 
or qualified majority voting. This definition thus comprises the ordinary legislative procedure, 
the EU’s main process of decision-making since the Lisbon Treaty took effect on 1 December 
2009 (see Art. 294 of the TFEU), as well as its predecessor, the co-decision procedure, 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and extended by the Amsterdam Treaty (1999). 
Additionally, if decision-making equals ‘intergovern-mental cooperation’, a policy-specific 
governance design might also be assumed complex according to the degree of supranational 
involvement: in general, this category encompasses policies for which the Commission shares 
right of initiative with the Council; the latter decides unanimously after the EP has been 
consulted. For the purpose of this thesis, the governance design underlying a policy is 
sufficiently complex if the Commission (and not the Council) enacted its right of initiative and 
proposed the legislation examined.
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the ‘community method’ (cf. Rittberger et al. 2016: 6).  Thus, the governance 21
design underlying the three policies is sufficiently complex to a comparable degree.

Finally, the substance of the three policies is similar: they all can be subsumed under 
the policy area ‘migration’ (cf. Rittberger et al. 2016: 6). Furthermore, the three 
policies are all linked to the free movement of persons principle of the EU’s common 
market and the Schengen agreement that abolished border controls among 
signatory states and created a common external border. Free mobility triggered a 
number of cross-cutting challenges to further integration in Europe towards the 
establishment of an “area of freedom, security and justice” (AFSJ) (see Art. 3(2) TEU; 
Title V, Art. 67-89 TFEU). In particular, they prompted the need to regulate labour 
migration within the EU in context of the nascent economic and monetary union as 
well as a harmonised policy towards third country nationals (TCNs) like asylum 
seekers at its doorstep. The EU therefore needed to establish, inter alia, a common 
border control and a common asylum policy since, without common external 
frontiers, a TCN admitted to any Schengen state, could freely move to any other 
(Moses 2014; also see, Lavenex 2015: 369; Monar 2015: 620f.). Hence, all selected 
policies represent measures necessitated by the “shadow of Schengen” (Moses 
2014: 600) to manage migration in a common area of free movement. The analysed 
material and time period were also constant in all cases (see 3.2.1).

Summarising, the selection of three similar cases of contested EU migration policies 
with varying implementation structures permits a controlled plausibility probe of the 
two-step model. In the next part, the methodological approach used for data 
gathering is introduced.

3.2 Measuring blame shifting by media content analysis 
How can blame shifting be measured? The theory-led expectations are examined on 
the basis of a qualitative media analysis of coverage on the three contested EU 
migration policies.  It follows the process model of a structuring content analysis 22
  	 The specific legislation is discussed in the three case studies (see 4.1.1, 5.1.1, and 6.1.1).21
  	 The qualitative content analysis of the public media discourse is broadly acknowledged as 22
suitable method used to analyse public responsibility attributions like blame shifting (e.g. 
Gerhards et al. 2007, 2009, 2013; Greuter 2014; Mortensen 2013; Schwarzenbeck 2017; Roose 
et al. 2016; Rittberger et al. 2016).
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developed by Mayring (2010: 92).  In the following, the sample selection process is 23
described and then the coding rules are presented.

This thesis aims at investigating blame shifting by policy-makers in the public, 
represented by the media discourse.  The quality press is chosen as a proxy for the 24
latter.  In particular, the coverage of two leading quality newspapers in Austria (Die 25
Presse, Der Standard), Germany (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung), Ireland (The Irish Times, The The Irish Examiner) and the UK (The Guardian, 
The Daily Telegraph) as well as one quality newspaper with transnational reach (The 
European Voice) were examined.  Since the selected newspapers are constant 26
across the cases, comparative results are not affected by the choice of sources.

Relevant articles covering the respective policies were identified by conducting a 
keyword search in digital newspaper archives.  The type of article was not 27
restricted and thus the sample includes reports, editorials, commentaries as well as 
opinion pieces by politicians published online and in print editions. Search results 
were then reviewed and ‘false positive hits’, i.e. articles that did not address the 
respective policy and/or did not evaluate it as a failure, as well as duplicates were 
sorted out manually (see Annex, Table A.1). The case analyses cover a six-year 
period between 2010 and 2016.  The final sample included 911 articles which then 28
were searched for blame attributions by policy-makers.

  	 A structuring content analysis is best suited to answering the research question as it (i) requires 23
a deductive design; (ii) the analytical model is theoretical and rule-based, thus meeting the 
scientific criteria of reliability and validity to a greater extent than many other qualitative 
analytical methods; (iii) allows the precise construction of blame attributions to be filtered out 
and revealed in the text context since “minor differences in wording may have major 
attributional implications” (Ross/DiTecco 1975: 102; cf. Mayring 2010: 92-99).
  	 Research has characterised the role of the media regarding the direction of blame attributions 24
as mere reproducing (Gerhards et al. 2009, 2013; Greuter 2014; Rittberger et al. 2016).
  	 Quality newspapers are broadly assumed to be a good proxy for debates about policies in the 25
public (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2012: 39-40; Dolezal et al. 2016: 45; Brüggemann et al. 2009: 396; 
Gerhards et al. 2007, 2009; see also, Schwarzenbeck 2017: 73f.; Koopmans/Statham 2010).
  	 The selection of newspapers is regarded as a proxy for the European public discourse (cf. 26
Rittberger et al. 2016: 7). Not country-based differences but pragmatic reasons informed the 
selection of countries: the author’s language skills and the accessibility of newspaper archives. 
For each country, a liberal-democratic and a conservative newspaper was chosen to prevent 
bias. The European Voice was selected due to its detailed coverage of EU policies and policy-
makers. Differences of results across countries are discussed in subchapter 7.1.
  	 The general objective was to use the same keywords within one case as well as following a 27
similar structure in all three cases. Beyond language specific adaptions, modifications were 
made if an initial search scored too few relevant articles (see Table A.1 in the Annex for an 
overview of the concrete search terms). Since data of Rittberger et al. (2016) was partially used, 
the comparability with their keywords also informed the search strategy.
  	 Note that this does not apply for the European Voice since the digital archive only comprised 28
articles from Mai 2013 to April 2015. Temporal effects are not assumed to influence the 
direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting – and, indeed, no such deviations were observed.
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In a content analysis, all text components corresponding to the theory-led category 
system are extracted (cf. Mayring 2010: 92-99). In the following, the central 
categories are briefly presented while a detailed codebook with precise definitions 
and anchor examples as well as decision rules for cases of doubt are provided in the 
Annex (see Tables A.4, and A.5).  The central text component of interest – or 29
evaluation unit – in this thesis are blame attributions by policy-makers. It is defined 
to consist of (i) an individual or corporate policy-maker that attributes blame (sender 
of blame); (ii) a perceived policy failure for which causal responsibility is attributed 
(subject of blame); (iii) a actors at the national or EU-level to whom blame is 
attributed (direction of blame) (cf. Gerhards et al. 2009: 115f.; also see, 2.1).

Blame attributions can take various forms and thus require detailed coding rules 
(see Table 3.1 and Annex, Table A.4): they can refer to the actions (i.e. commission 
of an act caused harm) or the neglecting of actions by the blame target (i.e. the 
omission of an act caused harm) (cf. Sulitzeanu-Kenan/Hood 2005: 2f.; Hood 2011: 
6); and can be retrospective (i.e. a factual statement for the past) or prognostic (i.e. a 
prediction for the future) (cf. Gerhards et al. 2013: 116).

A statement was only coded if all three constitutive criteria of blame attributions 
were present (or at least could be deduced from the direct context).  In the example 30
below, (i) Italian interior minister ‘Mr Maroni’ (i.e. national level), shifts blame for (ii) 
the alleged failure that ‘Italy had been left entirely alone to deal with this latest wave 
of boat people’ (i.e. a retrospective blame for a failure caused by the omission to 
act), (iii) to ‘the EU’ (i.e. EU-level): “Mr Maroni complained that Italy had been left 
entirely alone to deal with this latest wave of boat people. The EU is doing 
absolutely nothing” (Agnew 2011: 12). All in all, 401 blame attributions by policy-
makers to the national or EU-level were identified in the sample.

To assess the predominant direction of policy-makers’ blame attributions – and thus 
to evaluate the conjectures – the distribution of blame targeted to actors at the 
national or EU-level was calculated. The share of blame attributions to the EU-level 
was divided in three categories: low (0-33%), moderate (33-66%), and high 
  	 I conducted two coding rounds using qualitative content analysis software (MaxQDA). Based 29
on the experience of the first round, the codebook was further elaborated.
  	 The analysis included not only statements by the governments of the examined countries and 30
the EU institutions but also attributions from governments of other member states since it is 
interested in the general distribution of blame between the two types of policy-makers. The 
high abstraction level was necessitated by the relative low observations numbers.
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(67-100%). On this basis, the plausibility of the theoretical expectations for the three 
cases will be evaluated (see Table 3.2).

Summarising, the collection of data was based on a qualitative content analysis of 
the quality press coverage on three contested EU migration policies. This 
methodological apparatus was used to identify the direction of policy-makers’ blame 
shifting within the three case studies presented in the subsequent chapters (4-6).

Table 3.2: Theoretical expectations for the three cases  




























Source: own compilation. 
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An actor’s action caused 
harm in the past.
An actor’s action will cause 
harm in the future.
passive
An actor’s inaction 
caused harm in the past.
An actor’s inaction will 
cause future harm.
Source: own compilation based on blame dimensions derived from Sulitzeanu-Kenan/Hood (2005: 
2f.), Gerhards et al. (2009: 115f.), and Hood (2011: 6). 
4 Playing the Blame Game on the EU-level:  
Blame Shifting for the Contested External Border Policy 
Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for the perceived failure of the 
EU border control regime? The findings of this case study lend support to the two-
step model: under the conditions of a complex governance design and active EU-
level implementation, member states attribute the bulk of blame to EU institutions 
while the latter only attribute blame to the EU-level to a moderate extend. The 
chapter is divided into two parts: first, after a brief introduction to the policy’s 
governance design and its public contestation, case specific expectations about the 
distribution of blame by EU institutions and member states are derived from the 
theoretical framework (4.1); second, the plausibility of these expectations is checked 
based on a qualitative content analysis of the quality press coverage (4.2).

4.1 The EU’s external border policy 
The abolishment of internal border controls due to the Schengen agreement caused 
the need for a common external border control system.  As a consequence, 31
member states deepened their co-operation regarding the border protection during 
the 1990s. The EU enacted various regulations regarding the management of the 
external border, and created institutional as well as financial capacities to assist 
‘frontier-states’ bearing disproportionate costs regarding border management. For 
example, the External Border Fund and the Internal Security Fund were set up. The 
most important institutional artifice established to secure Europe’s common external 
borders is the EU agency Frontex (Moses 2015: 606; Lavenex 2015: 381; Rittberger 
et al. 2016: 8). In the following, the complex governance design of the underlying 
policies as well as Frontex’ role as policy-implementer are depicted. Subsequently, 
aspects of the EU’s external border policy that were publicly contested are outlined. 
Against this backdrop, expectations about the distribution of blame shifted by EU 
institutions and member states under the conditions of a complex governance 
design and active EU-level implementation are derived from the theoretical 
framework.

  	 The external borders of the Schengen area are not identical with those of the EU due to opt-ins 31
of several non-member states as well as opt-outs of some member states with regard to the 
Schengen acquis (cf. Leuten et al. 2013: 19). In the following, the term EUʼs external border 
management refers to the external borders of the Schengen area.
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4.1.1 Complex governance design and EU-level implementation 
Frontex was established to assist member states operationally and to coordinate 
joint operations at the EU’s external land and sea borders (Moses 2015: 606).  The 32
EU agency was characterised as “a key actor” (Rijpma 2017: 217) in the EUʼs 
external border management as well as “the common face of the European Union to 
TCNs entering into the Schengen space” (Moses 2015: 606). Under its operational 
mandate, Frontex inter alia conducted two missions in the central and eastern 
Mediterranean funded by the EU to protect its external sea borders: “EU Naval 
Operations in the Mediterranean Sea work to save lives at sea, strengthen border 
control and disrupt the business model of traffickers and human smug-
glers” (European Commission 2016a: 1). Most prominently, operation Triton was 
established in 2014 and “supports Italy with border control, surveillance and search 
and rescue in the Central Mediterranean” (ibid.; cf. Rittberger et al. 2016: 8). 
Furthermore, operation Poseidon “provides Greece with technical assistance with 
the goal of strengthening its border surveillance, its ability to save lives at sea and its 
registration and identification capacities” (European Commission 2016a: 1). 
33
EU border control policies were decided through complex governance structures. All 
regulations establishing and transforming Frontex followed the ‘community method’ 
and thus can be subsumed under the category of joint decision-making where the 
Commission proposes a policy, which the EP jointly enacts with the Council.  EU 34
border control operations require active implementation by Frontex. While the EU 
agency coordinates joint missions in the Mediterranean like Triton and Poseidon, the 
deployed officers work under the command of the authorities of the country hosting 
the operation (Frontex 2018). However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is decisive 
  	 Frontex was established in 2004 by Regulation 2007/2004/EC that was repealed by Regulation 32
2016/1624/EU replacing the ‘European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU’ with the ‘European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency’, officially launched on 6 October 2016, while the short name remained the same.
  	 During the examined period, Frontex also administered three smaller missions in the western 33
Mediterranean: the operations Hera, Indalo, and Minerva (European Commission 2016a: 2).
  	 While Regulation 2007/2004/EC establishing Frontex as well as its amendment by Regulation 34
863/2007/EC were decided under the co-decision procedure, its amendment through 
Regulation 1168/2011/EU, the changes to its mandate introduced by Regulations 1052/2013/
EU, 656/2014/EU, 2016/399/EU as well as its replacement through Regulation 2016/1624/EU 
both followed the ordinary legislative procedure. The operational design of Frontex is also 
complex: the management board of Frontex consists of two officials of the Commission as well 
as representatives of EU and Schengen member states and can be thus characterised as a 
“blend of intergovernmental and supranational control” (Moses 2015: 606). Moreover, while 
Frontex can draw on its budget to finance joint operations, any increases have to be approved 
by the EU’s budgetary authority, the Council and the EP. Despite their Schengen opt-outs, the 
UK and Ireland both have been granted observatory status in Frontex’s management board 
and were also involved in operations (Monar 2015: 621).
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that Frontex is “the most obvious institutional artifice in securing Europe’s common 
borders” (Moses 2015: 606; see also, Rittberger et al. 2016: 6). A differentiation 
between Frontex and its host countries is not made in the public discourse, where 
the EU’ border control regime was increasingly criticised in the examined period.

4.1.2 Public contestation: death at EU’s external borders 
The EU’s border control policy was harshly contested in the public. The main 
critique focused on its inability to prevent the deaths of refugees who aim at entering 
the EU via the Mediterranean and to deal with refugees at the EU’s external borders: 
“Refugees have been dying for decades trying to reach Europe” (Prantl 2013; 
translation THW). The reports about “flagrant conditions” (von Altenbockum 2014: 1; 
translation THW), “mass mortality” (Gabriel 2015a; translation THW) and “refugee 
dramas with thousands of deaths” (Die Presse 2015d; translation THW). Critics see 
EU border control operations contributing to the death of migrants either by doing 
not enough or too much.

On the one hand, the EU border control policy was seen to be unable to prevent the 
death of migrants in the Mediterranean: “The dead refugees are victims of neglected 
assistance” (Prantl 2011: 4; translation THW) or even “mass murder […] committed 
by accepting and taking into account death” (Menasse 2015; translation THW). 
Symbol of the EU border control policies’ failure was the “refugee disaster” (FAZ 
2013b: 1; translation THW) in 2013, when the sinking of a ship off the coast of the 
Italian island of Lampedusa caused over 350 deaths. Since its establishment in 
2014, the budget and resources of operation Triton were criticised as “short-
comings” (Agnew 2015) and insufficient for saving lives lacking far behind the 
preceding Italian search and rescue operation ‘Mare Nostrum’.  Also with regard to 35
the objectives of the EU border control policy in general and operation Triton in 
particular, the pre-eminently security-oriented perspective was criticised: “Operation 
Triton […] was not conceived as a rescue operation, but was intended to serve 
border security – an inadequate approach in light of the refugee drama in the 
  	 To respond to the incessant increase of migrants crossing the Mediterranean, in 2013, the 35
Italian government launched the search and rescue operation ‘Mare Nostrum’. Italy abandoned 
the operation in October 2014 because EU member states’ contributions were only marginal. 
Since search and rescue operations are not primarily part of the EU border control policy, this 
operation is not of concern for this thesis – however, critique for not including those goals in 
EU policies is. After yet more shipwrecks in 2015, which caused over thousand victims, Triton’s 
funding was expanded (European Commission 2016a: 1) while still falling short of ‘Mare 
Nostrum’ levels and without extending its operational scope (Der Standard 2015a: 11).
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Mediterranean” (Die Presse 2015c; translation THW). Thus, the “failure to mount 
effective naval patrols charged with saving lives is has been loudly condemned as a 
scandal” (Kirchgaessner et al. 2015). As a consequence, it is claimed that “the 
number of deaths has spiked” (Kingsley/Gayle 2015). During the ‘black week’ in 
April 2015, more than thousand people died (Gutschker 2016: 4).

On the other hand, the EU border control policy was criticised for attracting migrants 
to take the dangerous route via the Mediterranean in the first place. For example, 
operation Triton was criticised to “serve as a ‘pull factor’ for more asylum seekers to 
seek to cross the Mediterranean” (Sutherland 2015: 13) or to “encourage people to 
take perilous journeys” (The Guardian 2014). Furthermore, people traffickers would 
exploit EU missions – they switched from seaworthy ships to dinghies expecting 
migrant to be rescued: “The 160,000 migrants were overrun by European ships, not 
traffickers. […] This system is now as well established as that of the traffickers. Both 
systems really interact – a rescue chain from Tripoli to Catania. […] The bridge has 
become wider and more dangerous at the same time” (Gutschker 2016: 4; 
translation THW).

Finally, further critique focused on operational practices such as “turning away 
smaller boats on the high seas” (Der Standard 2013: 8; translation THW) or the 
illegal refoulement of asylum seekers, i.e. “push-backs of intercepted unauthorised 
migrants – their return to the last transit country without allowing them to make an 
application for asylum” (Vogel 2013c; cf. Prantl 2015).

4.1.3 Theoretical expectations: blame shifting to the EU-level 
Taken together, the EU’s external border policy (i) was perceived as a policy failure in 
the public due to its inability to prevent the deaths of refugees who aim at entering 
the EU via the Mediterranean; (ii) was characterised by a complex governance 
design since legislation was decided under the ‘community method’; (iii) required 
active implementation which was executed by the EU agency Frontex that, inter alia, 
coordinated joint missions in the Mediterranean like Triton and Poseidon.

If a contested policy’s governance design is complex and its implementation 
requires active execution by an EU-level actor, policy-makers’ blame is expected to 
be distributed as follows between the EU and the national level: 
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• Member states’ first preference is to shift blame to the EU – and the policy-
implementation structure enables them to realise this: member states’ share of 
blame to the EU-level is expected to be high (67-100%). 
• EU institutions’ preference is to blame the national level while the implementation 
structure points to the EU-level and thus constrains interest-led interpretations; 
since blaming the EU-level means a quasi self-attribution for EU institutions, they 
will at least try to also shift some of the blame to member states: EU institutions’ 
share of blame to the EU-level is expected to be moderate (33-66%).

4.2 Blaming the EU-level for death in the Mediterranean 
Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for the perceived failure of the 
EU border control regime? In the remainder of this chapter, the theoretically derived 
expectations are checked on the basis of a qualitative content analysis of the press 
coverage from 2010 to 2016. The measured distribution of policy-makers’ blame 
attributions between the EU and the national level lends support to the plausibility of 
the two-step model. In the following, the aggregated results for member states’ and 
EU institutions’ blame shifting are presented and illustrated by examples. Thereby, a 
particular focus is on the Commission constituting a ‘least likely’ observation.

4.2.1 Member states blaming the EU-level 
In line with theoretical expectations, the bulk of member states’ blame attributions 
(n=49) are targeted to the EU-level (84%) while only small a minority of statements 
shift blame to the national level (16%).  Hence, the majority of member states’ 36
statements blame the EU-level. On the one hand, it was criticised that the mandate 
of EU border control operations had been too narrow and thus did not prevent the 
death of migrants at the Mediterranean. For example, Italian prime minister, Matteo 
Renzi “accuse[d] the EU of betraying its basic values and decency in the handling of 
the crisis” (Traynor 2015b). Already four years earlier, Italian interior minister Roberto 
Maroni claimed: “The EU is doing absolutely nothing and is too slow and 
bureaucratic.” (cited by Agnew 2011: 12) Furthermore, the general director of the 
Greek coastguard blamed Frontex after the death of refugees off the coast of 
  	 In detail, member states attributed blame more often to ‘the EU’ in general (26) and Frontex 36
(15) than member states (8). The same pattern is found for individual blame senders 
represented with ten or more observations in the sample: the Italian (n=21) and the British 
government (n=13) both shift the bulk of blame to the EU-level (86% respectively 92%).
 26
Lesbos: “She (Frontex; THW) could have reacted better. […] We had expected 
additional ships and helicopters” (Der Standard 2015b: 9; translation THW). 

On the other hand, EU border control operations were criticised for attracting 
migrants to take the dangerous route via the Mediterranean by doing too much. For 
instance, even before Triton became operational, British foreign office minister Joyce 
Anelay accused Frontex that the planned mission would act as “an unintended ‘pull 
factor’, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and 
thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths” (Travis 2014). Similarly, 
French President François Hollande reportedly noted that Frontex’ missions “led 
more and more migrants to cross the Mediterranean” (Marlowe 2015: 10). 

On the contrary, statements by member states’ blaming national actors are rather 
rare. For example, after more than 700 people dying in the Mediterranean in one 
week in April 2015, Renzi “issued a harsh critique of his European partners for not 
assisting Italy” (Kirchgaessner et al. 2015).

4.2.2 EU institutions stuck in the middle 
As theoretically expected, EU institutions attribute blame more balanced (n=31): they 
direct responsibility for policy failures in 52% to the EU-level while in 48% member 
states are targeted.  Hence, a minority of EU institutions’ blame is targeted to 37
member states. For example, Commissioner Avramopoulos reacted to allegations 
that Frontex was doing too little to save lives by claiming: “Frontex is not a European 
border-protection system. If we want one we will have to build one. […] Building an 
EU coastguard is something which member states are not ready to counte-
nance.” (cited by Panichi 2015a) Furthermore, Claude Moraes, member of the EP 
(MEP) and Chair of its committee responsible for monitoring Frontex, claimed: “I will 
be pushing for an inquiry into the ethics and resources being utilised by member 
states in the this region” (The Guardian 2014).

The slight majority of EU institutions’ blame targets the EU-level. For instance, 
members of the EP blamed the Council, criticising their political actions as deficient 
rendering them responsible for the death in the Mediterranean: “Political will lags 
  	 In detail, EU institutions attributed blame to ‘the EU’ in general (12), the Council (2), and 37
Frontex (2) as well as to member states in general (13) and Italy in particular (2). For the 
Commission, the only individual blame sender represented with ten or more observations in the 
sample, the same blame shifting pattern is found (also see below).
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behind reality”  or “empty lip service and crocodile tears” . Moreover, against the 38 39
backdrop of the ‘black week’, High Representative Federica Mogherini noted: 
“I hope today is the turning point in the European conscience, not to go back to 
promises without actions.” (cited by Traynor 2015c) “With this latest tragedy […] we 
have no more excuses, the EU has no more excuses” (cited by Kirchgaessner et al. 
2015), she said, “it is time for the EU to tackle the tragedies without further 
delay” (cited by Straub 2015: 2; translation THW). Similarly, Commission president 
Manuel Barroso admitted: “the EU could ‘do significantly more than it has done so 
far’ to improve the lot of asylum seekers” (FAZ 2013b: 1). 
40
Among EU institutions, the Commission can be seen as the least likely actor to 
attribute blame to the EU-level. The Commission represents the interests of the EU 
as a whole and it is thus “in its immediate interest to present the EU and its 
institutions in a positive light” (Gerhards et al. 2013: 125, cf. 2009: 537; translation 
THW). Thus, the Commission has a strong preference not to blame the EU-level. 
However, the two-step model expected EU institutions’ blame shifting to be 
generally constrained by the visibility of Frontex implementing the policy and thus 
expected the share of blame to the EU-level to be relatively high or, in absolute 
terms, moderate. Indeed, in the sample, the Commission (n=24) attributed the same 
amount of blame at actors at the national and at the EU-level (50%).

4.2.3 Summarising the results: the EU-level blame game 
For the case of the contested EU border control policy, characterised by a complex 
governance design and active implementation by the EU agency Frontex, the two-
step model suggested policy-makers’ blame to be distributed as follows: member 
states’ shift blame to the EU-level to a high degree (67-100%) while EU institutions’ 
respective share is moderate (33-66%). 

The results of the content analysis of the quality press coverage confirmed these 
expectations (see Figure 4.1): member states shifted the bulk of blame to the EU-
level (84%) while the respective share of EU institutions’ blame amounted to a slight 
majority (52%). The examination of the attribution patterns of the Commission, 
constituting a ‘least likely’ observation, lends further support to the.

  	 Othmar Karas, MEP, cited by Gabriel 2015b; translation THW.38
  	 Rebecca Harms, MEP, cited by FAZ 2013b: 1; translation THW.39
  	 An alternative explanation for the COM’s attribution pattern is discussed in the conclusion (see 40
7.1). Interestingly, the bulk of blame directed to the EU-level by the Commission addresses ‘the 
EU’ in general (see above examples); this will be closer discussed in the conclusion (see 8.2).
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Summarising, the congruence analysis of the border control case strengthens 
confidence in the two-step model: under the conditions of a complex governance 
design and active EU-level implementation, member states – unconstrained to 
realise their first preference – attribute blame to EU institutions while the latter also 
substantially blame the EU-level since they are constrained by the policy-
implementation structure. As a consequence, when policies that meet these 
conditions get publicly contested, the blame game is dominantly played on the EU-
level. In such EU-level blame games, EU institutions have a bad hand: with member 
states pointing the finger to them and unable to shift the blame completely away 
from the EU-level, the buck is likely to stop there.
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5 Playing the Blame Game on the National Level:  
Blame Shifting for the Contested Asylum System 
Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for the publicly perceived failure 
of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)? The findings of this case study 
are in line with the two-step model: under the conditions of a complex governance 
design and active implementation by national authorities, both EU institutions and 
member states both shift the bulk of blame to the national level. This chapter is 
divided into two parts: first, after a brief introduction to the policy’s governance 
design and its public contestation, case specific expectations about the distribution 
of blame by EU institutions and member states are derived from the theoretical 
framework (5.1); then, the plausibility of these expectations is checked based on a 
qualitative content analysis of the quality press coverage (5.2).

5.1 The Common European Asylum System 
The elimination of internal border controls in the Schengen area has de facto created 
a common zone where asylum seekers can move freely across borders. Thus, a joint 
EU approach to asylum was required. Between 1999 and 2005, the EU agreed on 
several legislative steps assembling the CEAS in order to “harmonise the Union’s 
sundry asylum policies and to share responsibility for asylum seekers” (Moses 2015: 
606; cf. Monar 2015: 619; Rittberger et al. 2016: 9). In the following, the complex 
governance design of the CEAS as well as member states’ role as implementers 
regarding the examination of asylum claims are depicted. Then, aspects of the EU’s 
asylum system that were publicly contested are outlined. Against this backdrop, 
expectations about the distribution of blame shifted by EU institutions and member 
states under the conditions of a complex governance design and active policy-
implementation by member states are derived from the theoretical framework.

5.1.1 Complex governance design and implementation by member states 
The ‘Dublin system’ regulating the handling of asylum claims constitutes the 
“cornerstone” (Lavenex 2015: 381) of the CEAS by determining a “system of 
exclusive responsibility for the examination of asylum claims” (ibid.). In order to 
prevent an uncontrolled influx of refugees, secondary movements as well as the so-
called ‘asylum shopping’ and, at the same time, to guarantee the free movement of 
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people, one member state is obliged to decide for all on an asylum application 
(Monar 2015: 619; Moses 2015: 606; Biermann et al. 2017: 9)  In a nutshell, the 41
member state where an asylum seeker first enters the EU is responsible for the 
asylum claim; if the latter travels to other EU countries, he or she must be sent back 
to the member state where they first entered the EU (‘Dublin transfers’) (European 
Commission 2014: 7; cf. Rittberger et al. 2016: 9f.; Biermann et al. 2017: 9).  42
Moreover, since this system of responsibility allocation implies the mutual recog-
nition of decisions on asylum, it necessitated further regulation like a common 
definition of the term refugee as well as minimum standards for reception conditions 
and procedures (Lavenex 2015: 381; Monar 2015: 619).  
43
The legislation underlying the CEAS was decided through complex governance 
structures. Decision-making either followed the ‘community method’, where the 
Commission proposes a policy, which the EP jointly enacts with the Council  or the 44
special provisions of the transitional period after the Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 67(1) 
of the Treaty of the EC), where, following a proposal of the Commission, the Council 
decides unanimously while the EP is consulted.  The CEAS requires active 45
implementation which is executed by national authorities: the member state where 
an asylum seeker first enters the EU is responsible for processing the asylum claim 
under common standards (Rittberger et al. 2016: 9f.; also see, Lavenex 2015: 385f.; 
Moses 2015: 607). 
46
  	 The Dublin regime was established by the intergovernmental Dublin Convention in 1990 which 41
was subsequently replaced by ‘Dublin II’ (Regulation 343/2003/EC) and ‘Dublin III’ (Regulation 
604/2013/EU). Besides EU member states (except Denmark), Norway, Iceland and Switzerland 
apply its provisions in their territories (the latter were not included in the analysis).
  	 While the hierarchy of legal criteria for determining the member state responsible for evaluating 42
asylum claims highlight the aspect of family reunion, visa issuance and asylum applicant’s phy-
sical circumstances (see chapter III of Regulation 2013/604/EU; cf. Chalmers et al. 2014: 541), 
the bulk of asylum seekers is not covered by those rules (cf. Biermann et al. 2017: 9, note 3).
  	 Beyond ‘Dublin I-III’, the CEAS thus encompasses several further regulations and a set of 43
legislative measures aiming at adoption of common minimum standards for asylum proce-
dures: Directives 2003/9/EC (recast by Directive 2013/33/EU); Directive 2004/83/EC (recast by 
Directive 2011/95/EU); Directive 2005/85/EC (recast by Directive 2013/32/EU). The enforce-
ment of the ‘Dublin system’ is supported by the electronic fingerprint database EURODAC 
(Regulation 2725/2000/EC, 603/2013/EU).
  	 While Directive 2005/85/EC was decided under the co-decision procedure, ‘Dublin 44
III’ (Regulation 604/2013/EU) as well as Directives 2011/95/EU, 2013/32/EU, and 2013/33/EU 
followed the ordinary legislative procedure.
  	 Besides ‘Dublin II’ (Regulation 343/2003/EC), this was the case for the procedures leading to 45
Directives 2003/9/EC, and 2004/83/EC.
  	 The EU established the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in 2010, which is tasked with 46
“the facilitation of information exchange, the identification and transfer of best practices and 
the provision of support to Member states whose asylum and reception system are facing 
disproportionate pressures” (Monar 2015: 619; cf. Lavenex 2015: 381). However, the EASO 
was excluded as an implementer since it only played a minor role in the examined period.
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5.1.2 Public contestation: systematic deficiencies of the CEAS 
In the public discourse, the CEAS in general and the Dublin Regulation in particular 
were heavily criticised for a long row of dysfunctions. First, the ‘Dublin system’ was 
claimed to be unfair by overburdening member states at the EU’s external borders 
that have to carry the brunt of the burden of incoming asylum seekers due to their 
geographical position. The Dublin rules were criticised for placing “unbearable 
administrative and political burdens” (The Guardian 2016) on countries like Greece, 
Malta, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary. The latter “have simply been overwhelmed” (The 
Daily Telegraph 2015b: 19) and thus “have continually argued they carry an unfair 
burden” (Lynch 2015b: 9, cf. 2015a: 2; Rahmsdorf 2011: 13; Keating 2013).

Second and related, the CEAS was criticised for discrepancies in quality of national 
asylum systems in spite of common EU standards. In particular, criticism focused on 
the overcrowded and inadequate reception centres where asylum seekers arriving in 
such ‘frontier-states’ were often detained. Living conditions for asylum seekers in 
Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary were described as “poor” (Costello 2015: 14), 
“inhumane” (SZ 2011: 9; translation THW) and “catastrophic” (Kirchner 2010: 7; 
translation THW). For example, the UNHCR has described the situation in Greece as 
a “humanitarian crisis” (cited by Watt 2011a: 10). In Italy, a recognised refugee 
noted: “Frankly, in Africa, if someone had told me […] that even when you have the 
legal papers you still sleep on the street, I would’ve said that’s wrong […] You must 
see it to believe it.” (cited by Grant/Domokos 2011: 24) Furthermore, Hungary was 
criticised for holding refugees in prison-like facilities and the “often brutal treatment 
[…] by guards” (Brickner/Mayer 2015: 2; translation THW).

Third, the incentives for ‘frontier-states’ to shun compliance with the Dublin 
regulation, created by the latter in combination with the Schengen area, also draw 
criticism. Member states at the EU’s external borders were accused for applying a 
“wave-through approach” (Tusk 2016) by not registering asylum seekers who thus 
were able to transit to other EU countries: “Italy, Hungary and Greece have been 
permitting, or even quietly inviting, their asylum seekers to relocate to other 
countries” (The Daily Telegraph 2015b: 19; cf. Hannan 2011: 19; The Irish Examiner 
2015a, 2015b; Straub 2016: 7; Swinford/Holehouse 2015: 1; SZ 2015b: 8). 
47
  	 As a consequence, the ‘Dublin system’ was also criticised for putting disproportional pressure 47
on states offering comparatively attractive asylum conditions and high recognition rates. For 
example, the Swedish immigration minister stated: “We cannot be the one country, year after 
year, that is doing more than any other country” (cited by Holehouse 2015: 26).
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A fourth alleged failure of the ‘Dublin system’ was that ‘Dublin transfers’ back to 
‘first-arrival states’ were not possible: Due to the lack of registration as well as 
miserable conditions in detention centres, the return of asylum seekers to ‘frontier-
states’ was often unfeasible and in some cases even legally impermissible.  For 48
example, it was criticised that “if Greece does not respect human rights, it is not a 
‘safe host country’ and asylum seekers cannot be deported there” (Die Presse 2012; 
translation THW; cf. Huggler 2015: 15).

Finally, several unilateral actions by member states regarding the ‘Dublin system’ 
draw critique. For instance, Germany has been accused of breaking Dublin rules by 
refraining from repatriating Syrian refugees in summer 2015. Even though this was 
strongly rejected by the German government , some voices claimed that the 49
country “deliberately broke an EU law (Dublin III)” (Die Presse 2015f; translation 
THW) or “effectively waived the convention” (Lynch 2015d: 13). The German 
behaviour was denounced as “ill-judged” (Johnston 2015: 18), “toxic” (The Daily 
Telegraph 2016: 17) and “game-changing mistakes” (ibid. 2015c: 23). The 
consequence, according to the Commission, was “the collapse of the Dublin 
convention” (cited by Traynor 2015a) by creating, in the words of Hungarian prime 
minister Victor Orbán, a “surge of migrants to Europe” (cited by McLaughlin 2016: 4; 
cf. Kirchner/Rossmann 2015: 2; Ultsch 2015).  Furthermore, Hungary and Austria 50
were criticised for rejecting ‘Dublin transfers’ from other Member states: “The 
Hungarians and the Austrians have even unilaterally suspended the Dublin 
Convention under which they are required to take back refugees who have travelled 
through their countries to other parts of the EU” (The Daily Telegraph 2015a: 21; cf. 
Die Presse 2015e; Der Standard 2015c: 7). De facto lacking the possibility to send 
asylum seekers back to ‘first-arrival states’, several states unilaterally reintroduced 
border controls. For example, Hungary was criticised for “closing its external 
borders and pushing the problem on to neighbouring states” (Lynch 2015c: 13; cf. 
Laczynski 2015a).

  	 Multiple rulings by national as well as European courts prohibited ‘Dublin transfers’ back to 48
‘first-arrival states’ in single cases (e.g. Hungary, Italy, Malta) as well as in general (Greece) (cf. 
Grant 2011: 17; Whitehead 2011: 4; Costello 2015: 14).
  	 The German government argued that the decision had been in line with ‘Dublin III’ since its Art. 49
17 contains the right of self-admission (McLaughlin 2015a: 9; Löwenstein/Lohse 2016: 3). 
Some legal scholars however disagreed with this position (see Prantl 2016: 4). For the purpose 
of this thesis, the German decision to refrain from ‘Dublin transfers’ for certain asylum seekers 
qualifies as a policy failure since it was partially perceived and presented as such in the public.
  	 Hungary and Austria then sent asylum seekers to Germany without registration and were ac-50
cused for “breaking Dublin rules” (Thalhammer 2015; cf. The Irish Examiner 2015c; Rasche 2015: 
10).
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Against the backdrop of these developments, the whole EU asylum system faced 
strong public contestation and was widely perceived to have failed. For example, the 
media reported about “the lack of a functioning EU asylum policy” (Lynch 2015d: 13) 
and noted: “The European asylum system has failed in practice, the Dublin 
Regulation […] has not served its purpose” (Die Presse 2016a; translation THW). 
Similarly, a Commission spokesman stated that there were “systemic deficien-
cies” (cited by Rankin/Watt 2016) and Commissioner Timmermans claimed that “the 
present system is not working” (cited by The Irish Examiner 2016).  Moreover, 51
German chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly said that “the Dublin Agreement is not 
working” (Wölfl 2015: 4) and is thus “obsolete” (cited by Holehouse 2015a: 19).

5.1.3 Theoretical expectations: blame shifting to the national level 
Taken together, the CEAS in general and the Dublin Regulation in particular (i) were 
perceived as policy failures and even as totally broken in the public; (ii) were 
characterised by complex governance structures since decision-making followed 
the ‘community method’ or the Council decided at least under the involvement of 
both the Commission and the EP; (iii) and required active implementation which was 
executed by member state authorities responsible for processing asylum claims. 
If a contested policy’s governance design is complex and its implementation 
requires active execution by national authorities, policy-makers’ blame is expected 
to be distributed as follows between the EU and the national level: 

• Member states’ generally prefer shifting blame to the EU-level over blaming other 
member states; however, the policy-implementation structure constrains them in 
favour of their ‘second best’ option and blame the national level: member states’ 
share of blame to the EU-level is expected to be low (0-33%). 
• EU institutions’ preference is to shift blame to the national level – and the policy-
implementation structure enables them to realise this: EU institutions’ share of 
blame to the EU-level is expected to be low (0-33%).

  	 During the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, the Commission proposed a temporary but mandatory 51
quota-based scheme to relocate asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU countries 
as well as a regulation establishing a permanent relocation mechanism under the ‘Dublin 
system’ (European Commission 2015a, 2016b). These were excluded from the analysis since 
public debate in the examined period only concerned procedural questions as well as the 
appropriate governance level to solve the crisis.
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5.2 Blaming the national level for a dysfunctional asylum system 
Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for the publicly perceived failure 
of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)? In the remainder of this chapter, 
the theoretically derived expectations are checked on the basis of a qualitative 
content analysis of the press coverage from 2010 to 2016. The measured 
distribution of policy-makers’ blame attributions between the EU and the national 
level lends support to the plausibility of the two-step model. In the following, the 
aggregated results for member states’ and EU institutions’ blame shifting are 
presented and illustrated by examples. A particular focus is on the Eurosceptic 
Hungarian government constituting a ‘least likely’ observation.

5.2.1 Member states blaming each other 
Member states (n=212), in line with theoretical expectations, shift the bulk of blame 
to other member state authorities (80%) while only a minority of blame attributions is 
targeted at the EU-level (20%).  Hence, member states predominantly blame each 52
other. For instance, ‘first-arrival states’ were blamed for detaining asylum seekers in 
overcrowded and inadequate camps: French foreign minister Laurent Fabius 
condemned the “scandalous” and “extremely harsh” conditions for asylum seekers 
in eastern member states and particularly the Hungarian government: “Hungary is 
not respecting Europe’s common values.” (cited by McLaughlin 2015b: 8). 
Furthermore, Italy but also Greece and Hungary were blamed for waving through 
asylum seekers to other EU countries without registering them. For example, the 
Austrian and German foreign ministers reportedly “accuse[ed] the government in 
Rome for committing a breach of the Dublin II agreement, according to which the 
country responsible for a refugee is the one in which he first enters European soil: 
Italy […] would instead simply allow the refugees to move north” (Die Presse 2014b; 
translation THW). Additionally, some governments blamed Germany for having 
broken the Dublin rules by refraining from repatriating Syrian refugees. For example, 
Victor Orbán reportedly “accused the German chancellor […] of triggering a surge of 
  	 In detail, member states attribute blame more often to unspecified (groups of) member states 52
(29) as well as certain countries like Hungary (37), Germany (33), Italy (27), Greece (23), Austria 
(15) and others (6) than ‘the EU’ in general (36) and EU institutions like the Commission (3), the 
Council (1), and the EP (1). The same pattern is found for three out of four individual blame 
senders represented with ten or more observations in the sample: the German (n=55) and 
Austrian government (n=42) both shift the bulk of blame to the national level – the share to the 
EU-level is low (7% respectively 5%); the same is true for Hungary (see below). However, the 
Italian (n=11) government attributes blame to the EU-level to a moderate degree (55%).
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migrants to Europe by making Syrians exempt from the EU’s so-called Dublin 
rules” (McLaughlin 2016: 4) and “blamed Germany for encouraging people to risk 
their lives coming to Europe with its promise of more places for refugees” (Khomami 
2015). Finally, the German government, inter alia, criticised Hungary for rejecting 
‘Dublin transfers’ from other member states: “We must regard what the Hungarian 
government is doing as a clear violation of the (Dublin III; THW) rules.” (cited by 
Brickner/Mayer 2015: 2; translation THW)

On the contrary, member states blaming the EU-level is comparatively rare. For 
instance, justifying the practices of the Hungarian government, Orbán’s chief of staff 
accused the Commission for high numbers of asylum seekers in his country 
criticising “the policies of the past 10 years […] [representing] the leftist approach of 
the European Commission, according to which anybody should be allowed into the 
territory of the European Union” (cited by McLaughlin 2015a: 9). Furthermore, Orbán 
himself refused allegations of applying a ‘wave-through approach’ and reportedly 
accused the EU-level: “The EU Commission is to blame for the fact that 
approximately 200 migrants come to Austria each week. It had banned placing 
asylum seekers in closed camps“ (Löwenstein 2016: 4; translation THW). Similarly, 
UK home secretary Theresa May reportedly stated that “the failings of a ‘broken 
European migration system’ were exacerbated by passport-free travel through much 
of the bloc” (McLaughlin 2015b: 8).

Governments with a generally Eurosceptic position can be assumed least likely to 
choose blaming other member states over shifting blame to the EU-level. In the 
sample, the governing parities of Hungary, Orbán’s national-conservative Fidesz and 
the far-right Jobbik, are both Eurosceptic (Batory 2008; Schlipphak/Treib 2017: 
358-360). Thus, they can be assumed to have a strong preference to blame the EU 
instead of other member states. However, the two-step model expected member 
states’ blame shifting to be generally constrained by the visibility of national 
authorities implementing the policy and thus the share of member states blaming 
the EU-level to be low. In the sample, the Hungarian government (n=46) shifted 
blame to the EU-level ten percentage points above member states’ average (30%). 
Hence, while this distribution of blame meets theoretical expectations, a Eurosceptic 
position of government parties seems to exert a ‘shuttle effect’ (‘Fahrstuhleffekt’) on 
the share of blame shifting to the EU-level.  53
  	 Further implications of this finding will be discussed in the last chapter (see 8.2).53
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5.2.2 EU institutions blaming the national level 
As theoretically predicted, EU Institutions (n=40) shift the vast majority of blame to 
member state authorities (90%), while only few statements are directed to the EU-
level (10%).  Thus, member states received the bulk of EU institutions’ blame. For 54
instance, EU institutions blamed ‘first-arrival states’ for their inadequate treatment 
and accommodation of asylum seekers: Juncker reportedly “complained that 
national governments were failing to observe agreements on asylum proce-
dures” (Weaver 2015a), Cecilia Malmström “accused EU governments of […] failing 
to protect refugees from North Africa” (Watt 2011b: 10) and MEP Sylvie Guillaume 
described certain member states’ asylum systems as a “catalogue of the worst […] 
practices” (cited by The Irish Examiner 2013c). Furthermore, EU institution officials 
also repeatedly criticised what Council president Donald Tusk denounced as a 
“wave-through approach” (Tusk 2016). Finally, some EU-level actors also blamed 
Germany for having broken Dublin rules by refraining from repatriating Syrian 
refugees. For example, Tusk implicitly accused Merkel for her “weakness and 
indecision”: “One consequence of this was to suspend the EU’s […] Dublin rules, 
leading to the opening up of our territory to uncontrolled migration.” (cited by 
Holehouse 2016: 17) Also the Commission reportedly stated that “Germany’s policy 
had led to the collapse of the Dublin convention” (Traynor 2015a).

On the contrary, only a few blame attributions by EU institutions target the EU-level. 
For instance, Daniel Hannan, a British Conservative and MEP, claimed that “because 
of the entry into force of the EU’s Dublin Convention […] Britain could no longer 
return illicit entrants to France unless there was proof that France was where they 
had entered the EU” (Hannan 2011: 19). Furthermore, Tusk, “in a barb directed at 
Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker” (Weaver 2015b), stated: “We need to correct our 
policy of open doors and windows” (cited by ibid.).

5.2.3 Summarising the results: the national level blame game 
For the case of the contested CEAS, characterised by a complex governance design 
and active implementation by member state authorities, the two-step model 
  	 In detail, EU institutions attribute blame more often to unspecified (groups of) member states in 54
general (13) as well as certain countries like Germany (9), Greece (7), Hungary (7), than to ‘the 
EU’ in general (3) and the Commission (1). The same pattern is found for the two individual 
blame senders represented with ten or more observations in the sample: the Council (n=16) 
and the Commission (n=15) both shift the bulk of blame to the national level – the share to the 
EU-level is low (13% respectively 0%). Note that all four statements blaming the EU-level stem 
from either Tusk or MEP Daniel Hannan (also see examples below).
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suggested policy-makers’ blame to be distributed as follows: both member states 
and EU institutions blame the national level to a high, and thus the EU-level to a low 
degree (0-33%). 

The results of the content analysis of the quality press coverage confirmed these 
expectations (see Figure 5.1): member states (80%) and EU institutions (90%) alike 
shifted the bulk of blame to actors at the national level respectively. The examination 
of the attribution patterns of the Eurosceptic Hungarian government, constituting a 
‘least likely’ observation, lends further support to the assumptions.

Summarising, the congruence analysis of the asylum system case strengthens 
confidence in the two-step model: under the conditions of complex governance 
design and active implementation by national authorities, EU institutions – 
unconstrained to realise their preference – attribute blame to member states while 
the latter also blame other governments as a ‘second best’ option since they are 
constrained by the policy-implementation structure. As a consequence, when 
policies that meet these conditions get publicly contested, the blame game is 
dominantly played on the national level. In such national level blame games, EU 
institutions have a good hand: with member states pointing to each other, they can 
shift the blame away from the EU-level and pass the buck to member states. 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6 Playing the Blame Game Across Levels:  
Blame Shifting for the Contested Entitlement  
of Intra-EU Migrants to Social Welfare 
Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for the publicly perceived 
problems connected to the entitlement of intra-EU migrants to social welfare? The 
findings of this case study corroborate the two-step model: under the conditions of 
a complex governance design and the absence of active implementation, member 
states shift the bulk of blame to EU institutions while the latter blame the national 
level. The chapter is divided into two parts: first, after briefly introducing the policy’s 
governance design and its public contestation, case specific expectations about the 
distribution of blame by EU institutions and member states are derived from the 
theoretical framework (6.1); then, their plausibility is checked based on a qualitative 
content analysis of the quality press coverage (6.2).

6.1 Free movement and Union citizens’ entitlement to social welfare 
According to the free movement of persons principle of the EU’s common market, 
Union citizens have the right to move and reside freely within any member state. 
This right includes their equal treatment in the country of residence: member states 
are obligated to refrain from discriminating between citizens and intra-EU migrants 
regarding their access to and conditions of employment as well as social benefits 
(see Art. 21, 45, 48 TFEU; Art. 34, 45 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU). In 
effect, “the dynamics of market integration have spilled over substantially into the 
EU social arena” (Leibfried 2015: 263). As a consequence, “a complex patchwork of 
regulations and court decisions has partially eroded national sovereignty over social 
policy in pursuit of European labour mobility” (ibid. 279; cf. Slaughter et al. 1997; 
Numhauser-Henning/Rönnmar 2013). In the following, the complex governance 
design underlying EU legislation concerning the entitlement of EU citizens to social 
welfare as well as the non-active character of their implementation are depicted. 
Subsequently, I outline the public critique that particularly focussed on the alleged 
enabling of systematic ‘welfare migration’. Against this backdrop, expectations 
about the distribution of blame shifted by EU institutions and member states under 
the conditions of a complex governance design and the absence of active policy-
implementation are derived from the theoretical framework.
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6.1.1 Complex decision making and non-active implementation 
The integration of social policy was impelled by secondary EU legislation and rulings 
by the ECJ adding up to “an incremental, rights-based homogenisation” (Leibfried 
2015: 281). Most importantly, the Citizens’ Rights Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC) 
entails Union citizens’ right of free movement: it defines conditions for the right of 
residence in another member state for more than three months and regulates equal 
treatment for access to social assistance; if a Union citizen residing in another EU 
country involuntarily becomes unemployed or his or her income has to be 
subsidised due to short-time work, minor employment or professional indepen-
dence, the country in which the activity is carried out is responsible. Furthermore, 
the EU coordinated social security systems and access to social benefits 
(Regulations 883/2004/EC): it is assured that Union citizens have social security 
coverage and do not lose rights when exercising their right to free movement in the 
EU; importantly, the principle of non-discrimination ensures that intra-EU migrants 
and nationals receive equal social benefits (also see, Rittberger et al. 2016: 10f.). 

In effect, EU legislation has two important consequences that restrict member states 
with regard to limiting eligibility for social transfers by territory and autonomously 
shaping their welfare-states (Leibfried 2015: 279-281). First, member states may no 
longer limit most social benefits to its citizens: “as regards non-nationals from within 
the EU, the state of legal residence no longer has any power to determine whether 
they are entitled to benefits […] Benefits must be granted to all – or withheld from 
all” (ibid. 281). Second, member states are not allowed to insist that benefits (e.g. 
child benefits) only apply to, and can only be provided within, their territory.

EU policies prescribing the entitlement of intra-EU migrants to social welfare were 
decided through complex governance structures. All regulations relevant for the 
examined period followed the ‘community method’ and thus can be subsumed 
under the category of joint decision-making where the Commission proposes a 
policy, which the EP jointly enacts with the Council.  The freedom of movement-55
related policies do not require active implementation. On the contrary, member 
states (and EU institutions) are obliged to refrain from direct political intervention 
leading to discrimination of intra-EU migrants (cf. Rittberger et al. 2016: 5). 
56
  	 While Directive 2004/38/EC as well as Regulations 883/2004/EC, and 987/2009/EC, defining 55
the implementation procedures of the latter, were decided under the co-decision procedure, 
their amendment by Regulation 465/2012/EU followed the ordinary legislative procedure.
  	 While the ECJ played a central role in homogenising social policy within the EU (Leibfried 2015: 56
263, 290), as a judicial actor, it was not regarded as an implementer.
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6.1.2 Public contestation: alleging systematic ‘welfare migration’ 
The EU policies concerning the freedom of movement of persons and the welfare 
receipt by intra-EU immigrants were strongly criticised in the public. Concerns were 
raised about undesirable effects of “interaction between free movement and national 
welfare systems” (Scally 2015: 9) leading to the “immigration into social 
systems” (FAZ 2013c: 17; translation THW). In particular, the entitlement of intra-EU 
migrants to claim access to social assistance at their place of residence was said to 
lead to so called ‘welfare tourism’, i.e. “the practice in which citizens of less affluent 
EU member states travel to richer ones, […] simply for the purpose of claiming 
benefits” (Watt 2014: 21; cf. The Irish Examiner 2013b). For example, Theresa May 
argued that free movement rules “are leading to abuse of the British welfare system 
by European Union migrants” (cited by The Daily Telegraph 2013: 16; cf. Wintour 
2013; FAZ 2014b: 21; Gardner 2014). Similarly, Angela Merkel claimed: “The abuse 
of such rules has left countries such as Britain and Germany facing an ‘onslaught’ of 
unjustified benefit claims.” (cited by Kirkup 2014: 4) Intra-EU migrants were 
described as constituting an “unacceptable burden” by Theresa May (cited by 
Waterfield 2013a: 19) and causing “considerable social problems” by threatening the 
sustainability of national welfare systems by the German 2013 coalition agreement 
(cited by Mason 2013b: 7). Public contestation reached a peak in 2014 when free 
movement-rules entered into force unlimited for citizens of Rumania and Bulgaria. 
Officials like German interior minister Hans-Peter Friedrich publicly warned about 
“social fraud and the threat of conflagration” (cited by SZ 2013: 6; translation THW).

The alleged systematic abuse of welfare benefits by intra-EU migrants reportedly 
took multiple forms: First, the latter were seen as primarily motivated by obtaining 
unemployment benefits. For example, intra-EU migrants from Rumania and Bulgaria 
were characterised as “‘social tourists’, who are only looking for the monthly 391 
Euros from Hartz IV” (Janisch 2015; translation THW; cf. Müller 2014: 1). 
Furthermore, it was criticised that intra-EU migrants systematically took low paid 
jobs in order to receive further in-work benefits: “The fathers of the family come to 
Germany, start working, rent an apartment, catch up on their family and apply for it 
since wages are not enough for everyone.” (Preuß 2016: 5; translation THW) Also 
UK prime minister David Cameron claimed that there was “an obvious risk that the 
migrants and their family will become a significant burden on the welfare system and 
the taxpayer” (cited by Kirkup 2011: 2; cf. SZ 2014: 6; Sparrow 2016). Moreover, 
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Labour politician Rachel Reeves publicly complained about “the absurdity of child 
benefit and child tax credits being claimed for children living in other coun-
tries” (cited by Wintour 2014; cf. Wintour/Traynor 2014; FAZ 2016a: 15). Additionally, 
intra-EU migrants were suspected to take advantage of generous pension systems. 
For example, it was feared that pensioners from eastern Member states might move 
to Austria to profit from subsidence (Fritzl/Özkan 2010). Finally, with regard to the 
expulsion of intra-EU migrants who abused social systems, Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands and the UK “complained that they could not be barred from re-entering 
the country virtually the next day” (Travis 2013). Altogether, the British government 
claimed: “We don’t think the current system is working.” (cited by Vogel 2013a)

6.1.3 Theoretical expectations: blaming the other governance level 
In sum, the EU policy entitling intra-EU migrants to claim access to social assistance 
at their place of residence (i) was perceived as a policy failure in the public as it 
allegedly enabled systematic ‘welfare migration’; (ii) was characterised by a complex 
governance structure since decision-making followed the ‘community method’; 
(iii) did not require active implementation but obliged policy-makers to refrain from 
direct discriminatory political interventions.

If a contested policy’s governance design is complex and does not require active 
implementation, policy-makers’ blame is expected to be distributed as follows 
between the EU and the national level:

• Member states’ first preference is to shift blame to the EU – and due to the 
absence of an active implementer they are unconstrained to realise this: member 
states’ share of blame to the EU-level is expected to be high (67-100%). 
• EU institutions’ preference is to shift blame to the national level – and due to the 
absence of an active implementer they are unconstrained to realise this: EU 
institutions’ share of blame to the EU-level is expected to be low (0-33%).
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6.2 EU institutions and member states  
blaming each other for ‘welfare migration’ 
Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for the publicly perceived 
problems connected to the entitlement of intra-EU migrants to social welfare? In the 
remainder of this chapter, the theoretically derived expectations are checked on the 
basis of a qualitative content analysis of the press coverage from 2010 to 2016. The 
measured distribution of policy-makers’ blame attributions between the EU and the 
national level corroborates the plausibility of the two-step model. In the following, 
the aggregated results for member states’ and EU institutions’ blame shifting are 
presented and illustrated by examples. 
57
6.2.1 Member states blaming the EU-level 
In line with theoretical expectations, member states (n=44) shift the bulk of blame to 
the EU-level (84%) while only a minority of statements attribute blame to national 
actors (16%).  Hence, the wide majority of member states’ blame is targeted at the 58
EU-level. For example, against the backdrop of fears of ‘welfare migration’ from 
eastern Europe, David Cameron claimed that “he shared the deep concerns of many 
people in Britain at the EU’s requirement to lift transitional controls on Romanians 
and Bulgarians in January” (Mason 2013a). Less subtly, his interior minister Theresa 
May reportedly “believe[d] that the EU free movement rules make it too easy for 
European migrants to come to Britain to establish residence and benefits entitle-
ments” (Waterfield 2013b: 12). Similarly, the chairman of the German co-governing 
party CSU Horst Seehofer reportedly “blamed the EU Commission for the migration 
problem” (Die Presse 2014a; translation THW) and, according to his secretary-
general Andreas Scheuer, “the Commission was seeking ‘free admission to the 
German social safety-net’ for non-Germans” (Vogel 2014).

On the contrary, only a few statements by member states’ blame national actors. For 
instance, Angela Merkel accused member states for causing problems themselves 
  	 In this case, no policy-maker qualifies as a ‘least likely’ observation. Only the UK and Germany 57
are represented sufficient observations in the sample. However, the leading governing party in 
the UK, the Conservatives, as well as the CSU, a German co-governing party, can be 
described as Eurosceptic (Maag/Kriesi 2016: 225-227). Thus, neither of the two governments 
can be assumed ‘least likely’ to choose blaming other member states over the EU-level.
  	 In detail, member states attribute blame more often to ‘the EU’ in general (24) and the 58
Commission in particular (13) than to the UK (4) and unspecified member states (3). The same 
pattern is found for the two individual blame senders represented with ten or more obser-
vations in the sample: the British (100%; n=18) as well as German (69%; n=13) government 
both shift blame to a high degree to the EU-level.
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by their inaction; she reportedly said that “there was a need for legislation but […] 
this would mainly be at the national level as member states consider aligning their 
welfare systems to avoid the abuse of freedom of movement” (Sparrow/Owen 2015).

6.2.2 EU institutions blaming the national level 
EU institutions’ attributions (n=44) meet theoretical expectations by exclusively 
shifting blame to member states (100%).  For example, in reaction to Theresa May’s 59
pleas for changes to the EU’s free movement rules, Commissioner Viviane Reding 
reportedly stated “that only Britain was to blame for any abuses of the benefit 
system by European nationals […] [and that] any abuse of benefits by European 
Union migrants is the fault of the Government which pays out too much” (Waterfield 
2013b: 12). “It seems that some national systems are too generous. Don’t blame the 
commission or EU rules for national choices and national regulatory systems.” (cited 
by ibid.; cf. Lynch 2013: 11) Similarly, Commissioner László Andor reportedly 
accused member states by claiming “that the rules are clear, but are not being 
applied properly” (The Irish Examiner 2013a). Finally, MEP Manfred Weber blamed 
the UK: “We need more honesty in Britain. In the course of EU enlargement, it has 
waived the transitional period of seven years. That is why there are so many citizens 
from Eastern Europe there today. That was a London, not a Brussels 
decision.” (cited by SZ 2015a: 7; translation THW).

6.2.3 Summarising the results: the cross-level blame game 
For the case of freedom of movement-related rules on the entitlement of intra-EU 
migrants to claim access to social assistance, characterised by a complex 
governance design and non-active implementation, the two-step model suggested 
policy-makers’ blame to be distributed as follows: member states attribute blame to 
the EU-level to a high degree (67-100%) while EU institutions prefer blaming the 
national level – thus, their share of blame targeted at the EU-level is low (0-33%).  
  	 In detail, EU institutions attributed blame to unspecified (groups of) member states (11) as well 59
as to the British (12) and German (2) government. Furthermore, the Commission repeatedly 
blamed member states, particularly the UK government, to artificially create the problem: for 
instance, Reding reportedly “accused Mrs May of talking up alleged benefit tourism by EU 
migrants as a way of shifting blame for the stalled economy away from the Government“ (The 
Daily Telegraph 2013: 16). However, these statements were not included in the sample since 
the described problem does not genuinely refer to the policy itself and ‘problem denial’ is a 
different strategy of blame-avoidance not under examination in this thesis (cf. Hood 2011: 154).
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The results of the content analysis of the quality press coverage confirmed these 
expectations (see Figure 6.1): member states shifted the bulk of blame to the EU-
level (84%) while EU institutions attributed blame only to the national level (100%). 

Summarising, the congruence analysis of the ‘welfare migration’ case strengthens 
confidence in the two-step model: under the conditions of complex governance 
design and non-active implementation, both member states and EU institutions are 
unconstrained to realise their preferences and predominantly shift the blame to the 
opposite governance level. As a consequence, when policies that meet these 
conditions get publicly contested, the blame game is dominantly played across 
governance levels. In such cross-level blame games policy-makers at the EU and 
national level alike point fingers – and pass the buck – to each other.  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7 Three Blame Games 
The three case studies demonstrated that the two-step model provides a plausible 
account of the distribution of policy-makers’ blame shifting within each of the 
examined policies. This chapter systematically contrasts the results of the individual 
case studies and discusses their robustness across countries and newspapers (7.1). 
Against this backdrop, the explanatory power of alternative explanations, particularly 
those offered by the existing research strands focusing on either policy-maker’s 
preferences or institutional opportunities, is checked in order to strengthen the 
plausibility of the two-step approach (7.2).

7.1 The variance of policy-makers’ blame shifting across cases 
The two-step model assumes that the combination of a policy-maker’s preferences 
(the demand side) as well as the specific policy-implementation structure (the supply 
side) shapes the direction of his or her blame attributions. Empirical findings of the 
case studies corroborated theoretical expectations about variation both across 
cases and between the types of policy-makers (see Figure 7.1 and 7.2). Firstly, 
concerning the external border policy, which is enacted by the EU agency Frontex, 
demand and supply for EU institutions point in opposite directions: blame 
attributions to the EU-level only amount to a moderate level (52%); to the contrary, 
institutional opportunities enable member states to shift the bulk of blame to the EU-
level (84%) according to their first preference. Secondly, in the asylum system case, 
where member state authorities are entrusted with implementation, the demand of 
both types of policy-makers is met by supply conditions: EU institutions (90%) and 
member states (80%) shift the bulk of blame to the national level. Thirdly, regarding 
‘welfare migration’, where active policy-implementation is not required and thus 
constraining supply conditions are lacking, EU institutions and member states 
realised their demand to attribute blame according to their first preferences: EU 
institutions exclusively blame the national level (100%) while member states shift the 
bulk of blame to the EU-level (84%). 

Furthermore, the difference between a ‘second best’ and a ‘second worst’ option for 
blame shifting can be seen in the results. The two-step model assumes that 
whenever policy-makers’ first preference and the policy-implementation structure 
diverge, member states have a ‘second best’ alternative, i.e. blaming other member 
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states, while EU institutions only have a ‘second worst’ option, i.e. blaming the EU-
level. The decisive difference is that for EU institutions blaming the EU-level means 
quasi self-attribution while for member states blaming other governments is only 
less convenient than blaming the EU-level (see 2.2.1). Consequently, the analysis 
finds EU institutions still shifting 48% of their blame to the national level despite 
diverging supply conditions while member states only attribute 20% of their blame 
to the EU-level in the asylum case.

Major country- or media-driven biases can be ruled out, since policy-makers’ blame 
patterns in the vast majority of newspapers and countries were in accordance with 
the two-step model (see Annex, Table A.2 and A.3).  With regard to newspapers, 60
only one clear deviation is found for member states in the Irish Times (n=36) blaming 
the EU-level over asylum policies to a higher degree than expected (42%).  Closely 61
  	 In detail, in 87% of constellations of the independent variables for which observations were 60
found in the sample, the results on the newspaper- (33 out of 38) and country-level (20 out of 
23) meet theoretical expectations. Furthermore, in four newspapers as well as two countries, 
every single finding for the six possible constellations is in line with theoretical predictions.
  	 Five further deviations are based on very low observation numbers: in the Irish Times, EU 61
institutions’ only blame attributions for border control policies (n=1) is targeted at the national 
level; on the contrary, in the FAZ, EU institutions (n=4) only shift blame for border control 
policies to the EU-level; in the Irish Times, member states (n=4) blame the EU-level for asylum 
policies in three out of four statements; regarding border control, in Die Presse, member states 
(n=2) assign one blame attribution each to the national and the EU-level and in Der Standard, 
EU institutions (n=6) shift blame to the EU-level in four out of six statements.
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Figure 7.1: Blame shifting by EU institutions 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Figure 7.2: Blame shifting by member states 
 
Border Control  
              (n=48)
Asylum System  
             (n=214)
Welfare Migration  
                  (n=44)







Blame to EU Blame to MS
connected, the only major exemption regarding the examined countries is member 
states (n=40) blaming the EU to a higher level than expected in the asylum case in 
Ireland (45%).  Thus, while most of the newspapers and countries show blame 62
patterns in accordance with the two-step model, Irish newspapers stand out 
regarding member states blaming the EU-level for failed asylum policies to a 
moderate and not low degree. It has to be noted that nine of the 24 blame 
attributions to the EU-level stem from the Hungarian government, which is the most 
often represented member state in both newspapers (see 8.2 for a further 
discussion). To be sure, the empirical results are not concluding as the number of 
observations should be increased in future studies. However, the analysed 911 
quality newspaper articles and 401 blame attributions provide strong support for the 
introduced model which is assumed to be a solid basis to assess its plausibility.

7.2 Assessing alternative explanations 
To further strengthen the confidence in the two-step model, alternative explanations 
have to be assessed for which case selection did not control.  In particular, both the 63
blame-avoidance and the governance design literature formulate expectations about 
the direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting. In the following, it is demonstrated 
that their isolated expectations are not sufficiently differentiated and thus do not 
account for the full variance of blame across examined cases and between the 
types of policy-makers.

The blame-avoidance literature expects the same pattern of EU institutions and 
member states blame shifting to be constant across all cases: national governments 
are assumed to shift blame to the EU-level as well as each other while EU institutions 
are expected to blame the national level. In other words: the distribution of blame in 
Figure 7.1. and 7.2 is expected to be relatively constant through all rows of each 
figure. However, while EU institutions’ blame attributions to the national level in the 
asylum (90%) and the ‘welfare migration’ case (100%) meet this assumption, the 
  	 The compilation of newspapers to countries was calculated by adding up the average of the 62
single newspapers. Two further deviations are based on very low observation numbers. For 
Ireland, another deviation is found concerning EU institutions only blaming the national level for 
failed border control policies. This is based on only one statement in the Irish Times as 
discussed above. On the contrary, regarding Germany, EU institutions shifted 100% of blame 
for border control policies to the EU-level (n=4). This equals the earlier discussed statements 
from the FAZ since the sample does not include any respective statements from the SZ.
  	 Since case selection was based on a MSSD, certain potentially confounding factors were kept 63
constant: the three examined policies were all publicly contested, decided by complex 
decision-making processes and belong to the policy area migration (see 3.1). Furthermore, the 
examined newspapers as well as time periods were the same in all cases (see 3.2).
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border case deviates from them: EU institutions only attributed a 48% of their blame 
to member states. Furthermore, while advocates of the blame-avoidance literature 
do not explicate member states’ exact preference order and, hence, all cases are 
generally in line with their assumptions, the variance of member states’ blame 
attributions across cases is stunning: member states attributed the bulk of blame to 
the EU-level in the border control (84%) and the ‘welfare migration’ case (84%), 
while, in the asylum case, a similar amount of blame was instead shifted to the 
national level (80%). Thus, the blame-avoidance literature is not differentiated 
enough to account for significant differences in member states’ blame attributions 
across cases. Most importantly, it is unable to predict EU institutions’ substantial 
blame shifting to EU-level actors in the border case.

The governance design literature assumes the policy-implementation structure to 
determine the general direction of policy-makers’ blame: if a policy requires active 
implementation, the agents entrusted with this task are assumed to become focal 
and bear the brunt of the blame. In other words, the distribution of blame in the 
upper two rows in Figure 7.1. and 7.2 should equal each other. While policy-maker’ 
blame attributions in the asylum case are in line with this assumption – EU 
institutions (90%) and member states (80%) both shift the bulk of their blame to the 
national level – they diverge in the border control case: the share of blame attributed 
to the EU-level differs by 33 percentage points between member states (84%) and 
EU institutions (52%). Furthermore, while this research strand does not theorise on 
the direction of policy-makers’ blame for policies lacking active implementation, the 
variance between the two types of EU policy-makers is stunning: member states 
shifted the bulk of blame to the EU-level (84%) while EU institutions exclusively 
blamed the national level. All in all, the governance design literature is not sufficiently 
differentiated to account for EU institutions and member states’ cross-cutting blame 
shifting patterns in the ‘welfare migration’ case and, most importantly, fails to 
explain EU institutions’ blame attributions in the border case.

Finally, one further alternative explanation for the specific constellation of the 
Commission blaming the EU-level has to be carefully reviewed since this pattern 
was earlier examined as a ‘least likely’ observation in order to strengthen the two-
step model (see 4.2.2). The ‘problem ownership thesis’ assumes that the Com-
mission will strategically blame the EU-level in order to gain further competences 
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during problem solving.  Thus, we should expect the Commission to blame the EU-64
level if it has an interest in reform. While the Commission proposed policy reforms 
regarding both border control as well as asylum policies , it refused changes of EU 65
rules regarding the alleged problem of ‘welfare migration’ . While the expectation 66
about the covariation of the Commission’s reform interest and blame shifting to the 
EU-level is compatible with findings in the border control (52%) as well as ‘welfare 
migration’ case (0%), the ‘problem ownership thesis’ cannot account for the asylum 
case: despite its interest in reforms, the Commission does not attribute responsibility 
for perceived policy failures to the EU-level. Thus, while the Commission’s blame 
shifting patterns across these cases poses a puzzle for the ‘problem ownership 
thesis’, the two-step model offers a plausible account for all of them.

Summarising, the combined two-step model accounts for the distribution of blame 
shifting across the three cases of contested EU migration polices as well as between 
the types of policy-makers. Separately, as suggested by the alternative explanations 
of existing research strands, the variables do not possess the same explanatory 
power. Thus, the combined two-step model enables more differentiated predictions 
about policy-makers’ blame shifting in the EU.  
  	 Thanks goes to Moritz Weiss for this critical remark during the IR colloquium. This argument is 64
in line with strategies described by Ecker-Erhardt (2017) who finds that, in reaction to policy 
failure in form of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, the UN publicly admitting 
blame goes hand in hand with claiming authority over the problem solution process. Thus, by 
‘escaping ahead’ (‘Flucht nach vorne’), a publicly perceived failure can be used to push for 
reforms in one’s own interest (see also, Greuter 2014: 72). Note that, as a general rule, 
‘competence attributions’ about which governance level should solve a perceived problem 
were not coded as blame attributions.
  	 Regarding border control, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European Border 65
and Coast Guard (EBCG) to support member states in securing the EU’s external border 
(European Commission 2015b) and, regarding the asylum system, a regulation establishing a 
permanent relocation mechanism under the ‘Dublin system’ (ibid. 2016b) and, before, the a 
temporary but mandatory quota-based scheme to relocate a total of 160,000 asylum seekers 
from Italy and Greece to other EU countries (ibid. 2015a).
  	 For example, Commissioner László Andor claimed that “the perception of some member states 66
has nothing to do with reality […]. The Commission will not come up with a solution proposal 
for a non-existent problem” (cited by Gabriel 2013; translation THW; cf. Laczynsk 2014); 
Commissioner Reding added: “Our EU rules are good and they are here to stay. Member states 
need to apply them to tackle abuse.” (cited by Waterfield 2013b: 12)
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8 Conclusion 
Whom do EU institutions and member states blame for contested EU policies in the 
public? Starting point of this thesis was the theoretical critique of existing literature 
examining the conditions under which blame is directed to the national or the EU-
level: while two research strands identified independent variables explaining the 
direction of blame attributions – policy-makers’ preferences as well as policy-
specific institutional opportunities –, they do not refer to each other. In this last 
chapter, the proposed two-step model integrating insights of both strands and the 
empirical findings corroborating its plausibility are summarised (8.1). Subsequently, I 
point out the contributions of this thesis and pathways for future research (8.2). The 
last section elaborates on political consequences and problematises them with 
regard to their normative implications for policy-makers’ accountability (8.3).

8.1 The explanatory power of the two-step model 
To fill the identified research gap, this thesis developed a two-step model that 
integrates insights of two literature strands and explains the direction of policy-
makers’ blame attributions by the demand for blame shifting as well as supply 
conditions. Building on the blame-avoidance literature, the demand for blame 
shifting is assumed to be shaped by policy-makers’ preferences. Based on their 
position in the EU’s multi-level system as well as their motivation to minimise blame, 
two types of EU policy-makers favour different blame targets: EU institutions desire 
to shift blame to the national level; member states prefer to blame the EU-level, 
while, as a ‘second best’ alternative, they also blame other member states. Based 
on the governance design literature, supply conditions constituted by the 
institutional opportunities for blame shifting influence whether the demand for blame 
shifting can be met: while the EU’s complex governance design opens scope for 
strategic communication, the latter is not necessarily unconstrained. If EU policies 
require active implementation, the public visibility of the implementer constrains or 
enables interest-led blame attributions since policy-makers also want to obtain an 
‘illusion of objectivity’ vis-à-vis their audience. In sum, the combination of policy-
makers’ diverging preferences (demand) as well as the varying policy-implemen-
tation structure (supply) shapes the direction of their blame attributions.
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The plausibility of the two-step model was corroborated by conducting a media 
content analysis by – for the first time – systematically examining blame shifting by 
different types of EU policy-makers in three cases of contested migration policies 
with varying governance designs. Thereby, this thesis uncovered empirical variation 
between European blame games so far overlooked by the state of the art. First, in 
EU-level blame games, characterised by contested policies requiring active EU-level 
implementation as in the border control case, EU institutions have a bad hand: with 
member states pointing the finger predominantly to them and unable to shift the 
blame completely away from the EU-level, the buck is likely to stop there. 
Conversely, national level blame games taking place when contested policies are 
implemented by member state authorities, as in the asylum system case, provide 
the EU institutions with a better hand: since member states point to each other, they 
can conveniently pass the buck to the national level. Finally, in cross-level blame 
games where contested policies not requiring active implementation, like in the 
‘welfare migration’ case, policy-makers at the EU and national level alike point 
fingers – and pass the buck – to each other. The empirical analysis revealed that the 
two-step model was able to account for the full variation both across cases as well 
as between types of EU policy-makers. Thus, the two-step model constitutes a solid 
basis for explaining the demonstrated variation in the direction of blame shifting.

8.2 Contributions and future research 
The empirical analysis not only revealed that the combined two-step model can 
explain the direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting but also demonstrated that the 
two alternative explanations, proposed by the blame-avoidance and governance 
design literature and being based on either one of the two independent variables, 
cannot explain the full empirical variance. This upgrades confidence in the synoptic 
two-step model and underlines the main contribution of this thesis: the development 
of an integrated theoretical approach that enables more differentiated predictions 
about the direction of policy-makers’ blame shifting in the EU. While this entails 
qualifications of both research strands, the theoretical and empirical insights of this 
thesis – and their limits – also suggest pathways for future research.

Contrary to the blame-avoidance literature – and in line with the governance design 
literature –, the opportunity structure for strategic blame attributions in the complex 
EU multi-level system is not constant but varies across policies according to their 
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implementation structure. If a policy requires active implementation, this narrows 
down the margin of strategic attributions for policy failures towards the governance 
level tasked with its execution. In the course of this thesis, this so far unchecked 
assumption of the governance design literature was tested for the first time 
empirically. It was confirmed that even when policy-makers’ preferences point in the 
opposite direction, the implementation structure informs their blame attributions.

Against this backdrop, future research should more closely examine blame shifting 
by actors that are ‘caught in a tight corner’ due to undesired institutional constraints 
like EU institutions in case of policies enacted by the EU-level as well as 
implementing actors themselves. For example, the largest part of the Commission’ 
blame to the EU-level in the border case addressed ‘the EU’ in general; the specific 
implementing actor Frontex was targeted only one time. Future research could 
examine how close this comes to what blame-avoidance research coins ‘herding’ 
strategy whereby policy-makers “spread responsibility across numerous policy-
makers” (Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 103). In effect, while “herding does not remove the 
blame, […] it may blunt it by collectivising it” (Hood 2010: 100; cf. Weaver 1986: 
385). Thus, when supply and demand diverge, policy-makers may refuse from 
blaming a particular actor against their preferences – or even accepting blame 
themselves – but instead broaden the scope of their attributions to mitigate it.

Contrary to the expectations of the governance design literature – and in line with 
the blame avoidance literature –, policy-makers’ preferences have a considerable 
influence on their blame attributions: EU institutions and member states possess a 
distinct demand for blame shifting and thus show different attribution patterns, even 
if the institutional context remains constant. In particular, when policy-makers’ 
preferences diverge from institutional opportunities, the policy-implementation 
structure does not have a determining influence. In the absence of an active 
implementer, policy-makers’ blame attributions are pure functions of their diverging 
preferences. The empirical analysis also confirmed blaming the EU-level as member 
states’ first preference which so far remained a mere implicit or at least unchecked 
assumption (cf. Gerhards et al. 2005: 9; see also, Hobolt/Tilley 2014: 100f.).

The general insight on blame shifting under unconstrained conditions is also 
consequential for research on public responsibility attributions: in cases where the 
public is unable to employ the ‘policy-implementation heuristic’ due to the lack of an 
implementing actor, their responsibility attributions might not yet be “infrequent, 
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untargeted and thus diffuse” (Rittberger et al. 2016: 4); on the contrary, policy-
makers’ unconstrained blame attributions might have a significant impact on public 
perception. For example, Schlipphak and Treib (2017: 355) describe a mechanism 
whereby “élite actors […] signal their positions on the EU to their supporters, who 
then use these signals as information shortcuts for their own stance on European 
integration and European institutions”. Thus, future research on responsibility 
attributions in the general public concerning contested policies that do not require 
active implementation should take particular account of the influence of policy-
makers’ cueing strategies.

Moreover, the analysis disclosed observations that the two-step model cannot fully 
cover. The only major deviation found on the country- and media-level concerned 
member states in the asylum case shifting blame to the EU-level in Irish newspapers 
to a moderate instead of low degree as theoretically expected – with the Hungarian 
government being the most active sender of blame (see 7.2). Furthermore, the latter 
was found to generally attribute blame for asylum policies to the EU-level 
significantly above member states’ average (see 5.2.1). In both instances, the level 
of member states’ blame to the EU-level is above average while the supply side, i.e. 
institutional opportunities, attracted blame to the national level. Against this 
backdrop, a general Eurosceptic party position might influence policy-makers’ 
preference structure by strengthening the demand for blaming the EU-level.  67
Hence, future research should examine differences between member states’ blame 
attributions with regard to their general stance towards the EU.

Finally, to increase confidence in the proposed two-step model, it should be further 
checked based on higher numbers of observations as well as in more cases 
stemming from strongly differing contexts, e.g. policy fields, following a Most 
Different System Design (cf. Hönnige 2007: 227, 234). This would also allow to 
systematically check the plausibility of the theoretical framework between individual 
senders at the national (e.g. Eurosceptic vs. pro-EU governments) and EU-level (EP 
vs. Council vs. Commission).  
  	 Indeed, a similar pattern can be observed for the British government, whose leading party, the 67
Conservatives, can also be assumed Eurosceptic (cf. Startin 2015: 320; Maag/Kriesi 2016: 
226f.): it shifts blame to the EU-level above member states’ average in the amount of eight 
percentage points in the border control case (92%; n=13); 35 percentage points in the asylum 
case (55%; n=9); and 16 percentage points in the ‘welfare migration’ case (100%; n=18). 
Results for the asylum case were not discussed in 5.2.1 due to low observation numbers.
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8.3 ‘Accountability avoidance’ in the EU 
Beyond contributing to the development of research on blame shifting in the EU, this 
thesis points to a complex of problems of societal relevance: the opportunities and 
practices of policy-makers’ blame shifting set incentives for specific institutional 
design choices and have a general impact on their accountability. On the one hand, 
the identified institutional opportunities for presentational strategies of blame 
avoidance may also have implications for institutional design choices – or ‘agency 
strategies’ of blame avoidance (Hood 2011: 67-89). With EU policies getting 
increasingly politicised (Hooghe/Marks 2009; Koopmans/Statham 2010; de Wilde/
Zürn 2012; Hutter et al. 2016), particularly member state governments have strong 
incentives to evade blame by delegating implementation tasks to EU-level actors 
like EU agencies (cf. Hood 2011: 83; Rittberger et al. 2016: 13).  In other words, 68
where de-politicising EU policies is not feasible, governments can still evade public 
critique by exposing others to public contestation. This can be expected to be 
particularly likely regarding policies that have been shown high levels of public 
contestation in the past. For example, member state governments agreed to further 
increase the scope of Frontex’ implementation tasks when transforming it into the 
EBCG in late 2016, while, hidden behind institutional complexity, continuing to 
exercise hard control within the governing board (Bergmair 2017: 19-22). 
69
On the other hand, while European blame games differ, they all obfuscate political 
responsibility to certain degrees and thus hamper the accountability of policy-
makers for contested policies in which genesis they were involved. At best, all 
involved policy-makers blame each other – as expected for cross-level blame 
games. Here, at least all actors participating in decision-making get publicly blamed. 
In the worst case, the blame is predominantly attributed to implementers that were 
not part of decision-making themselves, as in EU-level blame games if an EU 
agency is enacting a policy. While Greuter (2014) welcomes non-elected actors 
getting blamed as “accountability without election” (see e.g. ibid. 29f.), such blame 
games are indeed detrimental to accountability in general since particularly member 
states might evade responsibility (cf. Rittberger et al. 2016: 13). 

  	 Note that this does not mean that the EU’s whole institutional architecture is determined by 68
member states’ blame avoidance strategies.
  	 An alternative strategy constitutes the externalisation of contentious implementation tasks by 69
relying on ‘softer’ governance arrangements beyond the EU (cf. Schwarzenbeck 2015, 2017). 
For example, against the backdrop of enduring immigration pressure, the EU’s management of 
migration flows has moved ‘outwards’ to cooperating with transit countries like Turkey and 
Libya in order to enhance migration control (Lavenex 2015: 381f.; more ibid.; Lavenex 2006b).
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Both aspects point out the perils of blame avoidance as ‘accountability avoidance’ 
in the EU, which is even said to represent “the ne plus ultra for blame avoidance 
architecture” (Hood 2011: 122, cf. 83, Gerhards et al. 2009: 553). Regarding the 
centrality of accountability to ensure the legitimacy of a political system (cf. 
Papadopoulos 2010) future efforts should be designated to design political proces-
ses in a non-complex way, i.e. ‘pure types’ of supranational or intergovernmental 
policy-specific decision-making, in order to ensure clarity of responsibility and thus 
improve accountability (cf. Zangl/Rittberger 2017: 10). Against the backdrop of rising 
Euroscepticism and the ongoing contestation of the EU itself, this will be one central 
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Table A.2: Documentation of results across newspapers 
Newspaper Case Blame by EU Institutions Blame by Member States
to EU to MS share EU to EU to MS share EU
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social abuse 0 3 0% 15 4 79%
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The Irish 
Examiner
border 0 0 - 1 0 100%
asylum 0 1 0% 3 1 75%*
social abuse 0 2 0% 0 0 -
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung
border 0 0 - 1 0 100%
asylum 0 2 0% 4 9 31%
social abuse 0 4 0% 0 0 -
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine
border 4 0 100%* 2 0 100%
asylum 0 2 0% 5 35 13%
social abuse 0 0 - 0 0 -
Die Presse
border 1 1 50% 1 1 50%*
asylum 0 5 0% 3 53 5%
social abuse 0 1 0% 7 0 100%
Der Standard
border 4 2 67%* 8 1 89%
asylum 0 6 0% 2 7 22%
social abuse 0 0 - 0 0 -
European Voice
border 4 7 36% 2 1 67%
asylum 0 0 - 0 0 -
social abuse 0 6 0% 4 0 100%
Note: a * indicates that the respective share of blame to the EU-level does not correspond with 
theoretical expectations. Source: own compilation. 
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Case Blame by EU Institutions Blame by Member States
to EU to MS share EU to EU to MS share EU
Austria
border 3 2 63% 5 1 82%
asylum 0 6 0% 3 30 8%
social abuse 0 1 0% 4 0 100%
Germany
border 2 0 100%* 2 0 100%
asylum 0 2 0% 5 22 17%
social abuse 0 2 0% 0 0 -
Ireland
border 0 1 0%* 3 0 100%
asylum 0 1 0% 9 11 45%*
social abuse 0 2 0% 1 0 100%
United  
Kingdom
border 2 2 43% 11 3 81%
asylum 2 10 17% 5 22 19%
social abuse 0 5 0% 13 4 78%
Note: results represent the summary of respective average of the two examined newspapers per 
country; a * indicates that the respective share of blame to the EU-level does not correspond with 
theoretical expectations. Source: own compilation. 
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Table A.4: Coding rules 
Category Example Coding Rule
Subject of blame 
A perceived policy 
failure for which 
blame is attributed
• Failure border control: “David Cameron  
[…] declared that the ‘coastguard policy’ – 
a reference to Triton – that replaced Mare 
Nostrum, had not worked.” (Travis 2015)

• Failure asylum system: “[…] a person’s 
chance of getting protection depends 
upon where they lodge it. The current 
mixture has been described as a 
‘catalogue of the worst national practices’ 
by Sylvie Guillaume, the French Socialist 
MEP” (The Irish Examiner 2013c)

• Failure welfare migration: “The Home 
Secretary (Theresa May; THW) […] talks 
over […] abuse of the British welfare 
system by European Union migrants.”  
(The Daily Telegraph 2013: 16)
• The subject of blame may  
only be coded if (i) activities 
are explicitly described as 
failures and (ii) linked to the 
case-specific policy.

Blame shifting and 
blame senders




• Blaming an actor for having caused 
policy failures in the past by his actions: 
“Viviane Reding, the EU justice 
commissioner, yesterday dismissed 
Theresa May's pleas for changes to the 
union’s free movement rules, telling the 
Home Secretary that only Britain was to 
blame for any abuses of the benefit 
system by European nationals”  
(Waterfield 2013b: 12).

• Blaming an actor for having caused 
policy failures by his/her inaction in the 
past: “Mr Maroni complained that Italy 
had been left entirely alone to deal with 
this latest wave of boat people. The EU is 
doing absolutely nothing”  
(Agnew 2011: 12). 
• Blaming an actor for causing policy 
failures in the future by his actions: “In 
very diplomatic terms he (Commissioner 
Avramopoulos; THW) told the handful of 
MEPs present that unless member states 
got serious about earmarking money and 
resources to deal with the emergency, 
nothing would be resolved […] without 
‘decisive and coordinated EU-wide action’ 
the flow of asylum-seekers would 
continue” (Panichi 2015b)

• Blaming an actor for causing policy 
failures by his/her inaction in the future: 
“After the tragedy in Lampedusa,  
the EU gave tough words, and yet, 
Malmström said, there have been 
disasters again. ‘And they will probably 
happen in the future again.’”  
(FAZ 2013a; translation THW)
• The relevant blame senders 
are pre-defined as EU policy-
makers, i.e. the Commission, 
the Council, and the European 
Parliament (EP); blame 
attributions by other actors 
were not coded

• A new blame attribution  
is coded when the sender 
changes

• If an attribution has more than 
one sender or target, the 
statement is coded for each 
sender or target separately

• Blame attributions can  
(i) refer to the actions  
(i.e. commission of an act 
caused harm) or the 
neglecting of actions by the 
blame target (i.e. the omission 
of an act caused harm)  
(cf. Sulitzeanu-Kenan/Hood 
2005: 2f.; Hood 2011: 6)  
as well as (ii) be retrospective  
(i.e. a factual statement for  
the past) or prognostic/
hypothetical (i.e. a prediction 
for the future) (cf. Gerhards et 
al. 2013: 116) (see examples)

• Blame attributions can be  
(i) direct when the author of an 
article was a policy-maker as 
well as (ii) direct quotes or  
(iii) indirect quotes by other 
authors

• If a component of the blame 
attribution is missing, the 
statement is only coded  
if it can be derived from the 
direct context of the article
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Blame Acceptance 
An actor assigns 
blame for a policy 
failure to him-  
or herself
• Example of admitting blame  
(not coded): “Greece responded to this 
criticism by admitting failures in its 
system” (Der Standard 2011: 8;  
translation THW).

• Example of shifting blame within  
the EU-level (coded): “the EU could ‘do 
significantly more than it has done so far’ 
to improve the lot of asylum seekers”  
(Manuel Barroso, Commission president, 
cited by FAZ 2013b: 1; translation THW)
• If an actor attributed 
responsibility to him-  
or herself or the collective 
organisation he or she  
is part of (e.g. a minister to his 
government), this was coded 
as admitting blame and 
excluded from analysis

• An EU institution blaming an 
EU-level actor was only 
excluded if the target was  
the same institution  
(e.g. a Commissioner  
blaming the EU Commission)
Target of blame: 
EU-level actors  
An actor at the  
EU-level to whom 
blame is attributed
• “The EU Commission is to blame for the 
fact that approximately 200 migrants 
come to Austria each week. It had banned 
placing asylum seekers in closed 
camps“ (Victor Orbán, Hungarian Prime 
Minister, cited by Löwenstein 2016: 4; 
translation THW).
• This category is assigned if 
blame was attributed to or by 
actors at the EU-level. The 
latter is composed by all 
entities taking part in the 
decision-making process as 
well as any actor participating 
in policy-implementation (e.g. 
the Commission, the EP, the 
Council, EU agencies)

• Labels like ‘the EU’, ‘Brussels’ 
or ‘Europe’ were also coded 
as EU-level actors

• The ECJ as an judicial actor 
was coded as ‘other actor’
Target of blame: 
actors at the 
national level  
An actor at the  
national level to 
whom blame is 
attributed
• “Vienna and Berlin accuse the government 
in Rome for committing a breach of the 
Dublin II agreement, according to which 
the country responsible for a refugee is 
the one in which he first enters European 
soil: Italy […] would instead simply allow 
the refugees to move north” (Die Presse 
2014b; translation THW)
• This category is assigned if 
blame was attributed to  
actors at the national level  
(e.g. governments, and 
ministries)

• National courts and authorities 
below the federal level  
(e.g. German Länder, majors, 
and ‘job centres’) were coded 
as ‘other actors’
Target of blame: 
other actors 
An actor to whom 
blame is attributed  
is not part of the 
national or EU-level
• “Juncker added that it had to be clear  
[…] that the refugees could not choose 
where they wanted to go: ‘It cannot 
remain the case that those who come to 
Europe determine, in a smug manner, 
where they want to go and where they 
want to live’. No refugee has the right to 
refuse a local assignment.” (FAZ 2016b; 
translation THW)
• Actors that are not national  
or EU-level actors (e.g. civil 
society, journalists, non-EU 
governments, international 
organisations) are beyond the 
scope of theoretical model; 
they are summarised in the 
category ‘other actors’ and 
excluded from analysis.
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Table A.5: Decision rules in borderline cases 
 
Problem Example Coding Rules
• An attribution  
entails a broad 
category of 
actors (senders or 
targets) and then 
lists examples
• “Three weeks ago, Austria and Germany 
temporarily exempted people fleeing the 
Syrian war from EU rules requiring 
refugees to request asylum at the point 
where they enter the bloc. The move 
angered neighbours such as Hungary, who 
said it would merely encourage more 
migrants to come.” (Weaver 2015b)
• If one blame statement entails 
a broader category of actors 
(senders or targets) and then 
lists examples, all are coded 
separately since special 
emphasis is one certain actors 
while they do not fully 
represent the blame target 
respectively sender individually
• Attributions to a 
rule or policy
• Example not coded: 
“The Home Secretary [Theresa May]  
is in Luxembourg today for talks over  
‘free movement’ rules that, she argues,  
are leading to abuse of the British welfare 
system by European Union migrants”  
(The Daily Telegraph 2013: 16)

• Example coded:  
“the EU free movement rules make it too 
easy for European migrants to come to 
Britain to establish residence and benefits 
entitlements” (UK home Secretary Theresa 
May, cited by Waterfield 2013b: 12). 
• In general, whenever the failure 
was attributed to a rule or a 
policy, no responsibility 
attribution was coded. 

• However, the target is coded  
if the rule or policy is directly 
associated with a policy-maker 
and thus possesses a minimal 
agency reference







• “Merkel also appeared to criticise Hungary 
by noting that minimum standards for the 
accommodation and care of refugees ‘are 
not always met at EU borders’.” (Weaver 
2015b)
• Since the author assessed  
the statement in its original 
context and with background 
knowledge, and statements are 
presented as such in the public 
discourse, coding follows the 
authors’ interpretation. 




another actor for 
alleged past 
misbehaviour
• “I will be pushing for an inquiry into the 
ethics and resources being utilised by 
Member states in the this region.”  
(Claude Moraes, MEP, Chair of the  
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 
Committee, cited by The Guardian 2014)
• Since legal actions clearly 
indicates that an actor 
assumes another to be guilty 
of misconduct with regard to 
the relevant policy, this was 
coded as blame attribution
• Credit is given for 
changing past 
behaviour, which 
is described as 
having caused  
a policy failure
• “The EU had finally assumed its respon-
sibilities after years of ‘chatter’ and 
realised that the Mediterranean was not 
just Italy’s frontier but the responsibility  
of the whole of Europe, he said.”  
(Italian interior minister Angelino Alfano, 
cited by Squires 2014: 17)
• If a policy-maker grants 
another actor credit for 
changing his or her behaviour 
that is at the same time 
evaluated as failure, this is 
coded as blame attribution





• “It is the responsibility of Hungary to 
ensure that refugees get their rights […]  
It must not happen that people are 
prevented from applying for asylum with 
barbed wire.” (Commissioner Valdis 
Dombrovskis, cited by Laczynski 2015a)

• “The EU could ‘do significantly more than 
it has done’ to improve the lot of asylum 
seekers.” (Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso, cited by FAZ 2013b: 1; 
translation THW)
• In general, blame statements 
are causal responsibility 
attributions and not 
‘competence attributions’;  
thus, the latter are not coded

• However, if a problem is 
depicted as being in the scope 
of responsibility of a certain 
actor and the latter is depicted 
as causing the failure by the 
omission to act, the statement 
is coded as blame
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